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I. INTRODUCTION

A sixty-six-year-old Florida man was jailed briefly in 2008 for
failing to follow a court order to comply with the rules of his
homeowners association, which required him to sod his lawn.' Due to a
rise in his adjustable rate mortgage payment, he asserted that he could
not afford to follow the landscaping requirements of the residential

* Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law, Gulfport and Tampa, Florida.
B.A. & J.D., University of Virginia; LL.M., Georgetown University. The author thanks Sarah
Grimme and Amy Rigdon for their valuable research assistance as law students. This Article
was supported by a generous scholarship grant from the Stetson University College of Law.
1. Erin Sullivan, Man Jailed for Brown Lawn Gets Help from Neighbors, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct.

13,

2008,

http://www.tampabay.com/news/humaninterest/article

850257.ece.
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covenant. 2
Not far from Prudente's lawn, a 24-year-old woman faced a fine of
$1,000 a month for placing a sign that said "Support Our Troops" on the
front yard of her home. 3 Although Kelley's husband was serving in Iraq,
her residential community enforced a covenant that banned all signs on
the residential properties.
The question is whether these property owners have a "right" to
contravene certain covenants of their homeowners association (HOA).
Over the past few decades, the HOAs and their variants have
transformed private home life in America by imposing, in effect, a layer
of "private government" on their residents, complete with rules that, in
many instances, go far beyond the laws of traditional public
government.5 While HOA communities once were popular only with

2. Id.
3. Stephanie Hayes, 'Support Our Troops' Sign Stolen from Yard, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2006, http://www.tampabay.com/SearchForwardServlet.do?articleId=300919.
4. Id. One can find many stories about intrusive HOA covenants and rules. See, e.g., Paul
Bannister, Homeowner Horror Stories: Associations are Heaven or Hell (a litany of stories,
including that of a California man punished by his HOA for planting too many roses, and a
Georgia family who was fined for placing a pink flamingo on their lawn),
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/real-estate/homeowner-horror-stories-associations-are-heaven
-or-hell.aspx (last visited July 28, 2009); KDVR News, Loveland Couple Battling HOA Over
Flag Display, Feb. 4, 2009 (HOA's barring the display of an American flag on a pole,
http://www.kdvr.com/news/kdvr-hoa-flag-020409,0,7067108.story (last visited Nov. 5, 2009);
Alexia Elejade-Ruiz, What's Next for Smokers?, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29, 2008 (discussing
application of anti-smoking ordinances to the interiors of condos), available at
http://smokefreeillinois.org/media/Happy%20Banniversary.pdf.
5. The issue is muddied at the outset by the confusion in terminology. There are many
names for private residential communities in which each resident is bound by a series of
covenants. Local governments often refer to the communities as "planned unit developments,"
which implies that the developer holds significant flexibility in land use within the development,
regardless of traditional zoning laws. The American Law Institute's Restatement of Law refers
to them as "common-interest communities," or CICs. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:

SERVITUDES § 6 (1997). Accordingly, many academic commentators use the term CIC or the
variant of common-interest development (CID). The chief organization of "residential
associations," another frequently used term, is called the Community Associations Institute. See
Community Associations Institute Homepage, www.caionline.org (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).
Among residents themselves, the most common terms are "homeowners association' (with or
without an apostrophe at the end of the first word, and sometimes without the plural) and
"condominium association" or "condo association," depending on the type of housing. Of
course, apartment resident and cooperative community owners also often have rules and
community organizations. In order to follow the theme of this piece-which is practical, not
theoretical-I use the term "HOA" throughout, because this is the term that most Americans use
in reference to their communities and their rules. Although this term might technically exclude
apartment organizations or communities with rules but no association, the term HOA is the most
straightforward and distinctive term.
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small segments of society-wealthy gated communities and housing for
the elderly, for example-HOAs have become the most popular new
form of private residential communities. In some regions during the
housing boom of the early 2000s, more than half of all new housing
construction was in communities in which residents were bound by a
panoply of covenants. 6 These rules, often called CC&Rs ("conditions,
covenants, and restrictions"), regulate many aspects of private conduct,
from the color of paint, to the size of backyard patios, to the number of
permissible guests. HOAs are often governed through a voting system
that harkens back to the property qualifications of the eighteenth
century. 7
The academic and legal worlds have debated vigorously whether the
triumph of the HOA system is a favorable development for the United
States. On one side, many commentators, citing the benefits of a free
market, have welcomed the rise of HOA as a system of private
ordering.8 Under this system, the argument goes, Americans who desire
to live by a set of rules more detailed than those of the public
government voluntarily choose to bind themselves and-most
importantly of course-their neighbors. On the opposing side, other
commentators warn that HOAs impose a stifling conformity on society.
These critics argue that HOA rules may not be truly voluntary and may
not reflect the true desires of their residents.9 In any event, their critique
continues, many of these rules have the effect of excluding those who
do not fit the socially conservative majority of the American populace.
Critics contend that scrutinizing courts should reign in HOA rules.
Courts could hold that HOAs are "state actors" that are bound by
federal and state constitutions; such a holding would grant residents
individual rights, such as the right to place a sign in the front yard. For
the most part, however, American courts have refrained from actively
imposing substantive limits on HOA covenants. Even the most

6. See Lisa J. Chadderdon, No Political Speech Allowed: Common Interest
Developments, Homeowners Associations, and Restrictions on Free Speech, 21 J. LAND USE &
ENvrL. L. 233, 235-40 (2006) (citing data, especially with regard to Sunbelt cities such as Las
Vegas).
7. Id. at 260-61.
8. See, e.g., Robert Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. Rev.
1519, 1520 (1982) (referring to the "perfectly voluntary nature of membership in a homeowners
association"); id. at 1523 ("[Mlembership in a private organization is "wholly voluntary."). For
a fuller discussion of this analysis, see infra Part III.
9. See, e.g., Paula A. Franzese, Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest
Communities and the Rise of Governmentfor the "Nice," 37 URB. LAW. 335 (2005) [hereinafter,
Franzese, Nice] (criticizing HOA suburbs as enforcing a code of "niceness"). For a fuller
discussion of this critique, see infra Part III.
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famously activist court systems have abjured from trying to impose
many social justice ideals on HOAs.' 0
Interestingly, the most active forums for vindicating individual
"rights" against HOA covenants have been state legislatures. Some
states have outlawed HOA rules, for example, that prohibit pets or that
require a green and lush lawn, thus conferring the right to have a waterconserving yard." But these legislative acts have been largely hit-andmiss regulation by subject matter, perhaps in response to individual
instances of seemingly unjust application of HOA rules. Legislatures
have not adopted statutes that follow a coherent theory of individual
rights.
It is also curious that there has been little academic commentary on
state statutes concerning HOA covenants. This is explained in part by
the natural perspective of academicians to scrutinize court-made law,
which logically appears to be pure "law," as opposed to legislative law,
which seems more like mere "policy." But this focus on court-made
law, under which there is in effect no regulation of HOA covenants,
creates a gap. Academicians have also commented, as is their wont, on
whether HOA covenants fit models of economic efficiency or models of
social justice.1 2 There has been little commentary, however, on whether
law should adopt a specific set of rules to restrain HOA covenants,
under a model of individual rights in a realm of private contract.
This Article undertakes that task. As I argue herein, there are
coherent arguments that HOA covenants are not fully voluntary; as a
result, a law commanding that certain covenants are off limits might be
justified. One might use a variety of approaches in crafting a "bill of
rights" for HOA residents against certain covenants. This article applies
a theory of personal integrity and liberty, using the federal constitutional
rights and traditional property law as its guides.
Part II introduces the phenomenon of HOA covenants and their rise
in regulating private American communities. Part III examines the
academic commentary and explores the criticisms that help guide the
creation of a set of rights. Part IV summarizes the current state of the
law, in which courts and legislatures largely have refrained from

10. See, e.g., Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 890
A.2d 947 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2006) (holding that HOA residents have a right to free
expression under the state constitution, regardless of the CC&Rs), rev'd, 929 A.2d 1060 (N.J.
2007) (reversing the lower court and concluding that the contractual CC&Rs bound the
residents).
11. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE

ANN.

§ 1360.5 (2009) (right to one pet in an HOA); FLA. STAT.

§ 720.3075(4) (2009) (right to plant a water-tolerant lawn).
12. For a fuller discussion of these points, see infra Part III.
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imposing substantive limits on HOA covenants. Part V draws lessons
from the earlier parts to craft a model bill of rights for HOA residents.
II. THE RISE OF THE HOA COVENANT

As attested by the old saying "A man's home is his castle," 1 3 the
traditional legal conception of a residence owned in fee simple
absolute' 4 was that a homeowner had the unfettered right to do with
the property whatever the owner desired. A homeowner could freely
build, tear down, use, or abuse his or her property. There were
limitations, of course. For example, a property owner could not act
so as to interfere unreasonably with another's use or enjoyment of
land-a tort concept that came to be known as the law of
"nuisance."' 5 Even before the modern regulatory age, governments
from time to time imposed restrictions on land use to protect others'
property, such as restrictions against building houses with wood in
London after the horrific fire of 1666.16 But homeowners rarely
entered into contractual duties with their neighbors concerning the
use of the land. Early real estate developers typically sold the
unfettered fee simple absolutes to the homebuyer, at which point the
developer left the scene. 1 7 This notion of a homebuyer as the
monarch of his land was especially strong in the Anglo-American
tradition, in which the individual resident, even in cities, preferred to
own a distinct and independent house,18 as opposed to an

13. The phrase is a traditional one in Anglo-American culture, extending back to old
England. See The Phrase Finder, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/an-englishmans-home-ishis-castle.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009) (giving historical examples of the usage of the
phrase).
14. See RESTATEMENT OF PROP.: FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 14-15 (defining the fee simple
absolute as an estate of unlimited duration and not subject to a special limitation).
15. See, e.g., Parks Hiway Enter. LLC v. CEM Leasing, Inc., 995 P.2d 657, 666 (2000)
(defining a nuisance as the substantial and unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment
of property); Town of Hooksett School Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F. Supp. 126, 133 (D.
N.H. 1984) (same).
16. See, e.g., FRED P. BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 99-104 (1973) (discussing the
history and limits of governmental regulations of private land).
17. When restrictions were imposed, they were more often in the form of the defeasibility
of ownership, through which a violation would "defeat" the possessor's ownership and transfer
it to another. Because of the bluntness of this instrument, both sellers and buyers sought out less
onerous ways of restricting land use.
18. See Kristen David Adams, Homeownership: American Dream or Illusion of
Empowerment?, 60 S.C. L. REv. 573, 595 n.115 (2008) (citing DONALD MACDONALD,
DEMOCRATIC ARCHITECTURE: PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO TODAY'S HOUSING CRISIs 52 (1996)
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apartmentl 9 or other unit in a multi-family housing complex. 2 0
With the industrial revolution, however, cities became busier and
noisier, and homeowners, especially the wealthy, began to look for
ways to create peace and sanctuary in their urban homes.21 Demand
begat supply, and real estate developers realized that if they could
offer homes with a guarantee that the neighborhood would remain
pleasant and peaceful, then homes there could be sold for a
premium. These guarantees came in the form of covenantsmeaning legal promises-that applied to all homes in a community.
One of the earliest developers to make such guarantees was Charles
Tulk, who tried in the early nineteenth century to guarantee a
pleasant residential neighborhood around London's Leicester
Square.22 The English High Court of Chancery held in Tulk v.
Moxhay23 that, as a matter of equity, the covenants Tulk included in
deeds to homeowners, including a covenant that the square be
maintained as a park, both bound all future purchasers and were
enforceable by injunctive relief.24 Although Tulk's plan for

("[D]escribing several practical and psychological reasons for the societal preference for
detached housing and stating that, 'for better or worse the image of the single-family home on
its own land is a deeply rooted American tradition,' and '[ifn many cases [physical separation
from other homes] was a decisive selling point"')).
19. In contrast to English cities, most European cities in the modem era adopted the
apartment building as the primary form of residential living. See MARC GIROUARD, CiTIEs &
PEOPLE 151-80 (1980) (discussing the examples of Amsterdam and Paris). Unlike in England or
the United States, where social classes were segregated by neighborhood geography, in
nineteenth-century Paris they were often segregated vertically within the same building, with
poorer classes having to climb the stairs to their more meager apartments. For a wonderful
drawing of this phenomenon, see France in the Age of Les Miserables, http://www.
mtholyoke.edu/courses/rschwart/hist255-sOl/mapping-paris/Paris-econ-space.html (last visited
Nov. 5, 2009).
20. See, e.g., Nat'l Park Serv., Chaco Culture: History and Culture,
http://www.nps.gov/chcu/historyculture/index.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2009) (discussing the
large housing blocks in the ancient native American Puebloan site of Chaco, in northeast New
Mexico, which reached its peak around 1000 A.D.).
21. See GIROUARD, supra note 19, at 271-85 (discussing the rise of the affluent and
segregated metropolitan neighborhood).
22. London was, and still is, full of small green squares, which in the nineteenth
century were often privately owned. Similar covenant-bound residences around small
squares were established at Gramercy Park in New York and in Louisburg Square in
Boston. Both are still privately owned parks. See EVAN McKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA 9 (1994).
23. 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Chanc. 1848).
24. Tulk sold homes around the square with various restrictions in the deeds,
designed to ensure that the property remained residential (even wealthy urban
homeowners in the nineteenth century were often shocked to see neighboring properties
turned into factories and slaughterhouses) and that the park was maintained. Id. at 1148.
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Leicester Square later succumbed to market forces for commercial
development, this decision showed the potential power of covenants
to maintain certain characteristics of the neighborhood and, just as
important, to attract potential home purchasers.2 5
The emergence of governmental "zoning" laws in the early
twentieth century 26 ensured that factories would not be built next to
mansions in many American cities. These land use laws both
separated residences from industry and businesses, and the homes of
the wealthy from the homes of the poor.2 7 While governmental
regulations offered a minimum level of comfort for homeowners,
they did not, however, offer a special attraction to a particular
neighborhood. Only covenants were likely to offer these effectively.
Tulk had been able to enforce his covenants because he still owned a
home on the square. But modern developers did not want to have to
retain ownership of land themselves; rather, they wanted to move on
to other locations. Thus arose the HOA, which is created by the
developer as an organization authorized to enforce the covenants,
and through a form of private republican government, create new
rules as the need may arise. 2 8 This technique was given a critical
green light by the influential New York Court of Appeals in 1936; in
Neponsit Property Owners'Association v. Emigrant Industrial Savings

Bank, the court held that even affirmative covenants to pay fees to
maintain common areas did indeed "touch or concern" the land,
which was a traditional requirement for covenants to bind future
owners. 29

After a man named Moxhay purchased one of the houses from an original purchaser, with
knowledge of the original covenants, he asserted that he was not bound by the covenants
because his deed did not contain them. Id.
25. In the twentieth century, Leicester Square became a center of London's theatre and
cinema district. For a history of the Leicester Square, see British History Online, Leicester
Square, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=45144 (last visited Nov. 11,
2009). A successful and notable American example of a planned affluent urban neighborhood
was the small but exclusive Audubon Place, built adjacent to St. Charles Avenue in uptown
New Orleans in the 1890s. This was also one of the first "gated" communities; Audubon Place
was and still is private street accessible only to the residents or their guests.
26. For a history of the development of zoning laws in the early twentieth century, leading
to the famous decision of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) which
upheld zoning as a constitutional exercise of the police power), see generally MICHAEL ALLAN
wOLF, THE ZONING OF AMERICA (2008).

27. For a wide-ranging discussion of the phenomenon of exclusionary zoning, see
CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE (1998).

28. For a short but informative history of the rise of HOAs, see MCKENZIE, supra note 22,
at 1-13.
29. Neponsit Prop. Owners' Assoc. v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y.
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Neponsit and other decisions paved the way for a vigorous use of
covenants in the creation of planned residential communities. 30
Developers were influenced by the utopian "Garden City"
movement and by the invention of the automobile, which enabled
citizens (only wealthy ones, at first, of course) to live in ireen and
pleasant surroundings a distance from urban employment. Kansas
City's Country Club Plaza and Los Angeles's Beverly Hills were
notable examples. 32 These new upscale developments offered the
promise of social and physical separation from the perceived riffraff of the urban environment. 33 For the other end of the housing
market, the Great Depression encouraged greater respect for the
concept of centralized "planning" to help less affluent Americans;
the federal government briefly supported the construction of ideal
new suburban towns for modest-income residents, such as
Greenbelt, Maryland.3 4 Unlike urban housing projects, Greenbelt
was carefully designed to integrate various types of housing with
schools, retail stores, lakes, curving streets, and much vegetation, so
as to offer the joys of suburbia even for the working class. 35 After
World War II, a more affluent America embraced the idea of
organized bigness in the economy, from large automobiles, to
parking-ringed shopping centers, to large new residential
developments that fed the car and mall. The most famous of these
postwar suburban developers was Abraham Levitt, who constructed
36
mass-produced "Levittowns" of inexpensive suburban homes.
Although these developments opened the door to suburban
homeownership for many families of modest incomes, they did not
do so for all: it was common for developers to discourage racial

1938).
30. See, e.g., Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496, 496-97 (1925) (holding that a property
owner must be bound by the zoning in a common scheme); Wehr v. Roland Park Co., 122 A.
363 (Md. 1923) (enforcing deed restrictions and fee assessment, even after purchase).
31. See MCKENZIE, supra note 22, at 9-13. For a discussion of the role of the car in the
development of planned suburbs, see KENNETH JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER 171-84 (1985).

32. See JACKSON, supra note 31, at 177-78; Country Club Plaza, Art & History,
http://www.countryclubplaza.com/About-Us/History (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).
33. For a discussion of the segregation of the wealthier classes from their poorer fellow
citizens, see MCKENZIE, supra note 22, at 57, 72.

34. Greenbelt touts itself as the result of the federal government's first venture into
housing. See City of Greenbelt, About Greenbelt, http://www.greenbeltmd.gov/about greenbelt/
history.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).
35. See JACKSON, supra note 31, at 195 (discussing the dead end of the 1930s Green Town
Program).
36. See id. at 234-38 (discussing the rise of the Levittowns).
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minorities from entering these all-white communities. One brutally
effective method of doing so was through covenants. Although
covenants against non-whites had existed in places such as
Brookline, Massachusetts, as early as the 1890s,37 early twentiethcentury suburbanization encouraged developers to focus more
diligently on enforcing segregation. In an oft-told story, the Federal
Housing Administration's 1938 manual for underwriting the
insurance of mortgage loans asserted that "[i]f a neighborhood is to
retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be
occupied by the same social and racial classes."3 8 The private sector
needed no encouragement; racially restrictive covenants were
common in new housing developments by the 1940s.39
In Shelley v. Kraemer, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1949 held for
the first time that a neighborhood covenant was unenforceable on
public policy grounds.4 0 The Shelleys, a black family, had purchased
a house in a St. Louis neighborhood where most of the titles to the
homes held covenants against selling to "people of the negro or
Mongolian Race." 41 The Court's conclusion that judicial
would
restrictive
covenants
enforcement
of
racially
unconstitutionally involve the government in racial discrimination
was a striking blow against racial discrimination per se; however,
the court's conclusion was not an endorsement of the idea that
courts should closely scrutinize residential covenants as a whole. 42
In any event, most suburban developments in the 1950s and 1960s
remained all or nearly all-white, through both subtle forms of
discrimination-such as real estate agents' steering black families to
certain neighborhoods-and the rise of HOAs, which often quietly
worked to ensure that undesired families were kept out of the
neighborhoods.4 3 After the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968

37. MCKENziE, supra note 22, at 35.

38. For a discussion of the infamous 1938 manual, see MCKENZIE, supra note 33, at 6465.
39. An influential book that highlighted the plight of racial segregation after World War II
was ROBERT WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO (1948). See id. at 229 (discussing the promotion and

appeal of segregated suburban neighborhoods). Weaver later was appointed by President
Johnson in 1966 as the nation's first Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and the first
black Cabinet member.
40. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1949).
41. Id. at 4-5.
42. For a discussion of the deferential scrutiny of private residential covenants, see infra
Part IV.
43. See MCKENZIE, supra note 22, at 72-76 (discussing history); see also Wendell E.
Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent
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outlawed most forms of overt housing discrimination, 44 it may be
asserted that discrimination in residential communities reflected that
in the rest of America: it was unlawful but still covertly prevalent. 45
Although the 1950s witnessed a great move toward suburbanization,
the 1970s experienced an even larger movement from the cities to
outlying areas.46 Despite predictions of the "revival of the city" in
recent years, Americans have steadily moved out of central cities and
away from small towns and farms to suburbs in the years since 1970.47
While the total U.S. population increased about 50% from 1970 to
2006,48 the suburban population rose by nearly 100%.49 Much of this
boom has been felt in communities with HOAs. It is estimated that, in
1970, about 2.1 million persons, or just about 1% of the population,o
lived in one of about 10,000 HOAs.5 1 By 1990, the estimates
indicated that 29.6 million HOA residents, or 8% of the U.S.
population, lived in 130,000 HOAs.5 2 Under the 2008 estimate, the

Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 32-36 (2003) (giving a history of the government's using
the designation of "blight" to exclude poor persons and African Americans).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006) (making housing discrimination unlawful).
45. For a more general assessment of racial segregation in the later twentieth century, and
the conclusion that discrimination is still prevalent, see DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID (1993).

46. The suburban percentage of the U.S. population rose from about 13% in 1940 to 37%
in 1970 to 50% in 2000. See SUBURB READER 2 (Becky M. Nicolaides & Andrew Wiese eds.,
2006) (citing census data). The figures are based on governmental boundaries; thus, a
neighborhood of single-family houses in the outer reaches of a central city is considered
"urban," even though it may hold most of the attributes of a suburb. Many older central cities
began to decline in population after 1950. See WORLD ALMANAC, POPULATION OF THE 100
LARGEST U.S. CITIES, 1850-2006, at 595 (2008) [hereinafter WORLD ALMANAC, POPULATION OF
THE 100 LARGEST U.S. CITIES].

47. For example, 7 of the 10 largest cities in the United States in 1970 (the exceptions
being the Sunbelt cities of Los Angeles, Houston, and Dallas) lost population in the 1970s, and
most of these older cities have continued to lose population. See id. Some of the most notable
examples are St. Louis, whose population fell from 856,796 in 1950 to 348,189 in 2000, and
Cleveland, which plummeted from 914,808 to 478,403. Id.
48. See WORLD ALMANAC, POPULATION BY STATE, 2000-2006, U.S. POPULATION BY
OFFICIAL CENSUS, 1790-2000, at 589, 593 (2008) [hereinafter WORLD ALMANAC, POPULATION
BY STATE] (noting U.S. population increase from about 203 million in 1970 to 300 million in

2006).
49. The suburban population rose from 75 million in 1970 to 140 million in 2000. See
SUBURB READER, supranote 46.

50. Community Associations Institute, Industry Data, www.caionline.org/info/research/
Pages/default.aspx (last visited May 13, 2009). These numbers and those that follow in the text
include HOAs, condo associations, cooperatives, and other organized residential communities.
5 1. Id.
52. See WORLD ALMANAC, POPULATION BY STATE, supra note 48, at 593 (noting total

American population of 299 million in 2006).
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number of HOA residents had reached 59.5 million persons in more
than 300,000 HOAs-5 3 or nearly 16% of the total American

population. 54
Why the boom in HOA living? In my view, the movement to
HOAs mirrors the market choices of Americans for larger and more
complex lifestyles. Just as Americans after 1980 traded in sedans for
SUVs, exchanged insured passbook savings accounts for uninsured
mutual funds and more exotic investments, gave up shopping at their
local Woolworth's and other small stores for a drive to the exurban
Wal-Marts and other megastores, many Americans began to demand
more than simply a house as their residence.ss With easy credit,
fostered in part by government programs to boost homeownership
rates and by low interest rates set by the Federal Reserve in a time of
prosperity, many Americans demanded larger homes with more
amenities. 6 Among these amenities was an HOA community, which
often provided common recreation areas, pleasantly landscaped
grounds, and a set of covenants that offered the promise of
controlling neighbors and ensuring a more predictable and pleasant
lifestyle.
The current estimate of one out of every six Americans in an
HOA underestimates the significance of the phenomenon. In older
metro areas, such as New York, Chicago, or New Orleans, the
housing stock tends to be older, often built before 1970. There are,
of course, few HOAs in older urban neighborhoods. In the rapidly
growing metro areas of the South and West, however, HOAs have
often become the norm. No city better exemplifies this phenomenon
than Las Vegas, Nevada. With its repackaging from "sin city" to an
"all-American" metro area after 1980, Las Vegas and its suburbs
grew more quickly than any other large metro area in the nation after
1980." Unlike cities such as Boston or San Francisco, its growth
was not hemmed in by geographic barriers or hamstrung by
restrictive zoning laws to hinder sprawl. Its lure of unregulated

53. Community Associations Institute, supra note 50.
54. See WORLD ALMANAC, POPULATION BY STATE, supra note 48, at 589 (noting total
American population of 299 million in 2006).
55. For essays on the rise of suburbs, including many criticisms, see SUBURB READER,
supra note 46.
56. For an interesting assessment of the modem housing experience, see Lee Ann Fennell,
Homeownership 2.0, 102 Nw. U.L.R. 1047 (2008).
57. Las Vegas's population rose nearly five-fold from 1970 to 2006, from 125,787, to
552,539, while its mega-suburb of Henderson blossomed over the same period from only 16,400
to more than 240,614. WORLD ALMANAC, POPULATION OF THE 100 LARGEST U.S. CITIES, supra

note 46, at 595.
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growth in a sunny climate, exciting atmosphere, and booming
economy drew Americans by the SUV load. Perhaps no other city
in the nation better exemplifies the housing boom of the 1990s and
early 2000s; Las Vegas became a center for subprime (meaning high
interest rate) loans, complicated mortgage terms, and McMansions
by the thousands, mostly for moderate income families, spreading
across the flat south Nevada desert. 5 9 Most new residential
construction during the housing boom was in HOA communities.6 0
The market alone did not demand the dominance of the HOA;
government also played an essential role. Money is, as with so many
things, an explanation. As private developers became willing and
able to handle infrastructure that traditionally was provided for by
government-laying out streets, burying sewer lines, fixing street
lights, and collecting garbage-local governments discovered that it
was financially beneficial for them to require, in effect, that these
expensive tasks be performed by the developer and the HOA. HOA
communities have taken over many of the traditional roles of
government-a "privatization" that has been criticized by many
academic commentators61 but that has been welcomed both by
developers, who are able to control the creation of infrastructure in
their communities without having to wait for government, and by the
government, which is freed from these tasks. The Las Vegas zoning
code requires, for example, that subdivisions include a landscaping
plan and that an HOA maintain this landscaping. 62
The dominance of the HOA in modern Las Vegas is mirrored
elsewhere, especially in the burgeoning states of the Sunbelt,
including Florida, Texas, and California, which are three of the

58. See generally EUGENE P. MOEHRING & MICHAEL S. GREEN, LAS VEGAS: A

(2005) (written at the peak of the boom).
59. See, e.g., Alexandra Berzon, Subprime Clean Up: Sadness Overwhelms, LAS VEGAS
SUN, Feb. 20, 2008, available at http://www.1asvegassun.com/news/2008/jan/30/subprimeclean-sadness-overwhelms/ (discussing the effect of the subprime mortgage boom and bust on
Las Vegas).
60. See Chadderdon,supra note 6, at 237-38 (quoting Evan McKenzie, one of the nation's
leading scholars of HOAs, and his assessment that "Las Vegas [has] virtually mandate[d] that
new development be done with homeowner associations"). Others have noted that the
limitations in the housing market may hamper the voluntariness of the choice of an HOA. See,
e.g., Gregory Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REv.
883, 900-02 (1988) (asserting the "coercive" nature of HOAs).
61. See, e.g., McKENZIE, supra note 22, at 176-83; see generally Franzese, Nice, supra
note 9 (criticizing HOA suburbs as enforcing a code of "niceness"); JACKSON, supra note 31 (a
critical history of the suburbs, focusing on the aspects of its conformity).
62. See 18 LAS VEGAS ZONING CODE § 18.12.500 (2009).
CENTENNIAL HISTORY
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nation's four most populous states. HOAs are also popular in new
exurban developments across the nation, even in the older areas of
the Northeast. Although precise figures are difficult to ascertain,
some have suggested that a majority of new residential construction
in many of these regions is in homes bound by HOA covenants. 64
Accordingly, it appears to be true that in some places, homebuyers
who seek-or are compelled, because of work-to live a suburban
area find that most of their housing choices are in HOA covenantbound communities. Interestingly, this empirical observation, which
questions the assumption of complete voluntariness in the choice of
an HOA, has received little attention in the academic commentary. 6 5
HOA covenants address an increasingly wide range of matters.
The covenants in the experimental days of Tulk and Neponsit
addressed only fundamental matters, such as assuring that the land
remained residential and that payments be made to support the HOA
and common areas. Today, however, sets of HOA covenants have
grown increasingly complex and have intruded more deeply into the
"castle" of the homeowner. 66 Because they are not, for the most part,
limited by the constitutional restraints on the government, HOA
covenants may extend far beyond what land use and zoning laws
would compel.6 7 It is true that traditional law of covenants requires
that they "touch or concern" the land in order to run with the landthat is, to bind future homeowners. 68 But Neponsit and modern cases
have interpreted this requirement broadly, and most HOA covenants

63. The most notable recent state court decision concerning the potential rights of HOA
residents, for example, arose in New Jersey Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers

Homeowners' Assoc., 890 A.2d 947 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2006), rev'd, 929 A.2d 1060 (N.J.
2007).
64. See Chadderdon,supra note 6, at 237-38 (quoting Evan McKenzie, one of the nation's
leading scholars of HOAs, and his assessment that "Las Vegas [has] virtually mandate[d] that
new development be done with homeowner associations").
65. Academic commentary is typically based on a model that assumes that a homebuyer
has a wide range of housing choices. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 8, at 1522 ("[M]embership
in a private organization is wholly voluntary").
66. See examples cited supranotes 1-2.
67. For the most part, conduct of an HOA is not "state action" and the limitations on
governments do not apply to HOAs, which are for considered privately created contractual
communities. See, e.g., Twin Rivers, 929 A.2d at 1071-76 (reversing a lower court and
concluding that an HOA is not bound in whole by a broad state constitutional right);
Chadderdon, supra note 6, at 247-61 (discussing potential arguments that an HOA could be
bound by rules limiting governments).
68. Neponsit Prop. Owners' Assoc. v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 794-98
(N.Y. 1938).
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today plainly do "touch or concern" the land.6 9 Moreover, as
explained herein, the American Law Institute's Restatement of
Property and state law have imposed some limitations. 7 0 But "on the
ground" across the nation, HOA rules have spread to astonishing
lengths. 71
It is common for HOA covenants to restrict many varieties of
conduct that might annoy neighbors or potentially decrease the
neighbor's property value. For example, HOA covenants might
require that the houses be painted in muted colors, the grass be
mowed to a certain height, pets not exceed a weight limit, and cars
not be parked on the street as opposed to the driveway.72 As HOA
governance has expanded, even more detailed intrusive covenants
have been imposed. They regulate intricate details of lawn
maintenance, such as trimming shrubs and limiting the ratio of tree
coverage to grass coverage. Beyond requiring that the house walls
not be painted pink and purple, HOA covenants may regulate the
color of window trim and indoor curtains.7 4 Accessories such as
doghouses and movable basketball hoops may be banished to the
backyard, if they are permitted at all. 7 5
Covenants sometimes intrude even into the personal and
expressive lives of the HOA residents themselves. Rules routinely
prohibit the placement of signs, even political signs, from front
yards. 76 HOAs have commanded that owners cannot park pickup

69. Neponsit held that a requirement to pay a fee to an HOA did indeed "touch or
concern" the land because the fee helped maintain the communal areas of the community,
increasing the values of all the residential properties. Id.
70. See infraPart IV for a discussion of state law and the Restatement.
71. The Restatement has proposed abandoning the "touch or concern" requirement. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.2 (2000). In its place, the Restatement
suggests a variety of restrictions on the breadth of HOA covenants. Id. § 6.7. Most states impose
some variant of the requirement that covenants be "reasonable" in order to be enforced. See
infra Part IV for a fuller discussion of this law.
72. See, e.g., Franzese, Nice, supra note 9, at 339-40 (discussing a variety of examples of
intrusive HOA covenants and rules).
73. See Duane D. Stanford, Covenants a Basisfor TurfBattles, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May
8, 2000, at IA (discussing restrictions on landscaping).
74. See David L. Kirp, Pleasantville, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1999, at 22, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/19/books/pleasantville.html?pagewanted=l (rules on interior
design).
75. See Cara DeGette, Playing Hardball,COL. SPRINGS INDEP., Aug. 10, 2000, available
at http://www.csindy.com/gyrobase/Content?oid=oid%3A2035 (enforcement of rule against
basketball hoop).
76. See Stephanie Hayes, Under Public Eye, Sign Disappears, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,

Apr. 29, 2006, at B3.
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trucks overnight in private driveways.7 7 In some places, magazines
may not be piled up in the living room. In condominiums and coops, some organizations have gone so far as to prohibit the wearing
of flip-flops or kissing in the condominium elevator.7 9
While HOA constitutions or declarations typically impose the
majority of these regulations, they frequently also authorize the
HOA board to adopt new rules as it sees fit-the parallel being to
statutes adopted from time to time by a government legislature.
These boards are composed of HOA residents, elected by the
membership. 80 Unlike public government, however, votes on HOA
regulations are sometimes not counted on the principle of oneperson, one-vote, but according to the value of the resident's
investment-a practice that harkens back to the eighteenth centurXv
practice of property qualifications for the voting franchise.
Because they are not governments, HOAs are not bound by
constitutional requirements of republican democracy. 82
Mechanisms for enforcement ensure that these covenants do not
remain merely paper commands. HOA constitutions typically
authorize the board to impose fines on violators, as well as to take
self-help measures against offending practices. For residents who
refuse to pay their fines, rules often allow the HOA to foreclose and
seize the residence of the offender without having to seek judicial
approval-thus giving HOAs greater powers than those that held by
mortgage lenders. 83 While the character of HOA boards no doubt
varies tremendously, some commentators have noted that boards

77. See Pickup Trucks bannedfrom parking in Driveway by Homeowners Association,
AUTOMOBILE MAG. (Aug. 19, 2008), http://blogs.automobilemag.com/6287190/car-news/
pickup-trucks-banned-from-parking-in-driveway-by-homeowners-association/index.html.
78. See Kirp, supra note 74, at 22.
79. See N.R. Kleinfeld & Tracie Rozhon, In Flat Market, Co-op Life Has Steep Ups and
Downs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1995, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/30/
nyregion/in-flat-market-co-op-life-has-steep-ups-and-downs.html (no flip-flops).
80. See MCKENZIE, supra note 22, at 122-47 (discussing the typical governmental
structures of HOAs); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES

§ 6.16 (2000) (setting

standards for election of board as a representative government to make and enforce rules).
81. See MCKENZIE, supra note 22, at 128; Comm. For a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin
Rivers, 890 A.2d 947, 949 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2006) (upholding a rule that gave more voting
rights to residents with a higher valued property).
82. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (establishing the principle of one person, one
vote); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 747 (1983) (imposing the one person, one vote
principle on state government).
83. See Don Taylor, Condo Dues Lapse May Prompt Foreclosure (July 16, 2009),
http://www.bankrate.com/fmance/mortgages/condo-dues-lapse-may-prompt-foreclosure.aspx
(noting that HOAs typically hold the right to foreclose for non-payment of fees and dues).

494

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 20

hold an unfortunate incentive to enforce rules without exception and
without sensible discretion in order to avoid being sued for
favoritism. 84 Thus HOA enforcement often differs from that of
governmental laws, under which police and prosecutors realize that
laws are often written broadly to cover conduct that, in particular
instances and under particular circumstances, should not be
penalized.8 5 Other commentators have concluded that HOA boards,
which are comprised of typical citizens, usually with little or no
training in governance, often include a disproportionate number of
"busybodies" who find no value in discretion and who may merely
enjoy wielding power against others.8 6
With these observations in mind, should law restrict HOA
covenants or their application, and if so, under what circumstances?
Should courts hold the powers to scrutinize the substance of rules or
applications on a case-by-case basis? Would such judicial
intervention interfere unproductively with the benefits of the private
governance offered by HOAs? Part III examines how other academic
commentators have approached these questions.
III. HOA COVENANTS: MARKET OR EXCLUSION OR BOTH?

The HOA covenant as a controlling feature in the lives of
millions of Americans has drawn considerable attention from
academic commentators. This is appropriate, because HOA rules
form, after traffic ordinances, the most common day-to-day form of
legal restriction on personal behavior in modern America. For the
most part, however, the commentary has focused on competing
theories of HOA rules, with little focus on the substantive details of
covenants of what sorts of "rights," if any, should be retained by
HOA residents.

84. See Susan F. French, Making Common Interest Communities Work: The Next Step, 37
URB. LAW. 359, 362-69 (2005) (discussing the incentive to avoid discretion).

85. For example, it is unlikely a driver will be cited for traveling two miles an hour over
the maximum speed limit on a freeway because police officers typically look for more serious
offenses. A bedrock principle of federal administrative law is that government holds the power
to decline to enforce a law in certain circumstances. The key case is Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821 (1985) (Food and Drug Administration held the power to decline to investigate alleged
abuses of drug usage in death penalty applications).
86. See Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REv.
1375, 1429 (1994) (identifying the "busybody" phenomenon); see also WINSTON S. CHURCHILL,
THEIR FINEST HOUR 15 (1949) ("Power, for the sake of lording it over fellow-creatures or adding
to personal pomp, is rightly judged base.").
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The theory that HOA covenants are the product of a free market
for contracts has, unsurprisingly, influenced a number of
commentators. Under this line of thinking, people choose HOA
communities because they prefer a residential environment in which
their neighbors, and themselves, are constrained by rules, which on
the whole makes everyone happier and more secure. Citizens choose
an HOA if they want to ensure, for example, that their neighbors
will not let the paint on their house peel or clutter their yards with
political signs. For those who prefer not to be bound by such rules,
the theory goes, they may avoid HOAs and may choose a more
traditional neighborhood, in which they and their neighbors are free
to act in any way that is permissible under governmental laws. This
line of theory postulates that the option to choose an HOA
maximizes the human happiness.8 7
Many of these commentators are influenced by the ideas of
Charles Tiebout, who in the 1950s asserted that people may "shop"
for a system of laws just as they might shop for goods and
services. 88 People who desire expansive local government-for
example, schools with well-paid teachers, a good library, and a wellmaintained park-can choose a town with these services, and
probably high taxes as well. Others who do not use or care about
these services can "vote with their feet" and chose another town,
with a low level of services, but also lower taxes. One citizen may
want to possess a handgun for home security; another may want to
live in a community in which handguns are outlawed.89 The market
for laws is facilitated by the American system of federalism and
devolution of authority to local governments, under which a citizen
has a choice of localities and a variety of legal options. 90
In an early and influential piece, Professor Robert Ellickson
considered HOAs "perfectly voluntary," in a work that compared

87. This syllogism follows nineteenth century libertarianism, which held that freedom of
choice maximized human happiness. See, e.g., John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (R. McCallum ed., 1946) (1859).

88. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcoN. 416, 422
(1956).
89. See id.; WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHEsIS 39-71 (Harv. Univ. Press
2001).
90. This discussion does not mean that all writers who employ economic analysis
conclude that HOA covenants are the happy result of voluntary contractual behavior. Lee Ann
Fennell has suggested ways that HOA rules often do not mirror the desires of its members. See
Lee Ann Fennell, ContractingCommunities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 829, 848-84. Fennell's work
is discussed in more detail infra Part III.
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government land use laws with those addressing HOAs. 91 Because
the decision to be bound by HOAs covenants is voluntary, whereas
being bound by governmental laws is not, Ellickson reasoned that
courts should scrutinize HOA rules under a more exacting standard
than that which applies to land use ordinances. 9 2 He cited examples
of a Jewish-orthodox-oriented community that wished to impose a
requirement that men wear yarmulkes in common areas on holidays,
and a community's banning of alcohol in the swimming area, as the
sort of voluntary contractual obligations that should not be subject to
tough judicial scrutiny. 9 3 Ellickson concluded that market forces will
keep prospective residents away from HOAs with rules that they do
not like, and that market forces will work to ameliorate potentially
onerous rules of all types. 9 4
Ellickson asserted that the courts' use of the prevailing standard
of "reasonableness" when reviewin HOA covenants is an "apparent
Reasoning that HOA rules are
invitation to Lochnerian activism.'
closer to routine private contracts than they are to governmental
laws, he concluded that courts should impose a special standard of
"reasonableness": "So long as the rule at issue does not violate
fundamental external norms that constrain the contracting process,
the rule's validity should not be tested according to external values,
for example, the precise package of values that would constrain a
comparable action by a public organization." 96

91. Ellickson, supra note 8, at 1520 (referring to the "perfectly voluntary nature of
membership in a homeowners association"); id. at 1523 ("membership in a private organization
is wholly voluntary").
92. Id. at 1526-28 (discussing examples illustrating why courts should not scrutinize
private contracts as thoroughly as governmental laws).
93. Id. at 1528-30 (discussing the examples of why courts should scrutinize private
contracts more thoroughly than government laws).
94. See id at 1524-25 (discussing the effect of discouraging unfair "redistributionist"
rules, at least for ex ante rules in the master declaration).
95. The "reasonableness" standard is discussed infra Part IV. Ellickson referred to
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1909), which was the most famous-or infamous-example
of judicial activism of the U.S. Supreme Court in the early twentieth century, at which time the
court imposed a free-market philosophy to strike down a number of laws to regulate businesspopular in the "progressive" era-with little basis in the text of the Constitution. Advocates of
judicial restraint cite Lochner as a prime historical example of how courts interfere without
authority on the workings of a republican form of government. See, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGEN,
EcoNoMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 23 (1980).

96. Ellickson, supra note 8, at 1530. His most notable suggestion for legal reform was an
idea to allow residents who object to a change in HOA rules to sue for a "taking" of property,
correlating to the right to sue the governments under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. Id. at 1535-39. Gerald Frug called this idea "truly astonishing." Gerald E. Frug,
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More recently, Professor Michael Heller characterized the boom
in HOAs as an example of the benefits of what he called a "liberal
commons"-a term used to refer to forms of propert ownership in
which private rights and public control are blended. While public
control of property can lead to an overuse of property-the famous
"tragedy of the commons"-a world of completely private realms
can lead to an underutilization of resources, which he called "the
tragedy of the anticommons." 98 A liberal commons allows for
freedom of individual choice to an extent, but also creates some
collective ownership in a way that is beneficial to the members of
the limited commons. Thus, we have the phenomena of HOAs
offering swimming pools and other amenities that are a mixture of
both public property (they are not owned by any single individual
and are shared by member persons) and private property (they may
be used only by members of the community and are subject to
community rules). 99 The explosion in the popularity of HOAs over
the past few decades, Heller concluded, has been "a stunning
example of the power of law in action-of getting a liberal
commons form right."100
Not all economically oriented commentary, however, has led to
the conclusion that HOA covenants are the happy result of consumer
choice. 101 For example, Professor Lee Ann Fennell has explained a
number of reasons why HOA rules might not reflect personal

Cities and Homeowners Associations:A Reply, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1589, 1592 (1982). See infra
Part V for a discussion of how the constitutional taking right could be applied to HOA
covenants.
97. Michael Heller, Common Interest Developments at the Crossroads of Legal Theory,
37 URB. LAW. 329, 332-34 (2005). Heller cites other examples as "corporations, partnerships,
family property, trusts, and co-ownership." Id. at 333.
98. Id. at 330.
99. See id. at 331-32 (discussing the swimming pool and other examples).
100. Id. at 333.
101. For another thoughtful assessment from an economically oriented perspective, see
Gillette, supra note 86, at 1388-91. He gave credence to the Tieboutian argument that private
HOAs allow for choice, thus permitting "birds of a feather to flock together." See id. at 1388-89
(citing Tiebout); see also id. at 1380-81 (choosing the striking example of Amish or Orthodox
Jews who wish to impose their unusual and restrictive lifestyles on their community with little
harm to the outside world). But Gillette also recognized some of the problems in assuming that
HOAs are wholly voluntary, including the problems of ignorance of rules by new residents, id.
at 1406-07, and the spillover effects to other communities by one HOA's exclusionary rules. Id.
at 1432. Interestingly, another problem is that HOA boards tend to be populated by
"busybodies" who enjoy making and enforcing rules against their neighbors for the enjoyment
of it. Id. at 1429.
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preference. 102 As with many complicated contracts, the "bundling"
of terms discourages non-repeat parties from paying much attention
to less significant provisions.1 0 Because HOAs are discouraged
from breaking the mold and allowing conduct that typically is barred
in other HOA communities-to do so would attract quirky
personalities to the sole "maverick" HOA-even fairly widespread
consumer aversion to restrictive rules may not be reflected in the
"path dependent" market.104
Perhaps most significantly, Fennell pointed out that, unlike
public governments, HOA boards typically do not selectively
enforce their rules.' 0 5 Governments, however, have wide discretion
in enforcing laws. As those who drive just a few miles per hour over
the speed limit know, they are unlikely to be ticketed because traffic
police have more serious matters to deal with. This selective
enforcement makes sense in part because written rules are unlikely
to capture all of the important factual nuances of a situation. Courts
have consistently upheld the governmental discretion in enforcement
and its non-reviewability before the courts.1 06 HOA boards,
however, do not hold this near-immunity from suit. Accordingly,
HOA boards may enforce rules even in circumstances that might
seem unfair to most observers-such as enforcing a lawn-watering
requirement in an extreme drought, or enforcing a no "overnightguests-for-longer-than-30-days" rule against a family who shelters a
relative made homeless by a hurricane. Despite the telling holes that

102. See Fennell, supra note 90, at 848-82. An earlier and more traditional critique of
voluntariness in HOA covenants was made by Alexander. Alexander, supra note 60, at 887.
Covenants are the most common type of servitude-so called because one property owner is
restricted, in order to "serve" the property or interests of another person. See id. at 883, 889.
Alexander focused his attack on the law that permits covenants to burden the land in perpetuity
as long as they are recorded, thus perpetuating a "dead hand" control of the land. Id. at 890-91,
899.
103. Fennell, supranote 90, at 873-81.
104. Id. at 864-70; see also Steven J. Eagle, Privatizing Urban Land Use Regulation: The
Problem of Consent, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 905, 905-06 (1999) (discussing the issues of consent
and dissent inherent in plans for private "urban neighborhood associations," as proposed by
Robert Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private
Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEo. MASON L. REv. 827 (1999)). As a
skeptic of solutions that depend on greater citizen participation in democratic governmental
affairs, I am skeptical of most "private government" solutions.
105. See Fennell, supranote 90, at 840-41 (discussing selective enforcement).
106. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985) (Food and Drug
Administration held the power to decline to investigate alleged abuses of drug usage in death
penalty applications).
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Fennell poked in the free-contract model, however, she offered few
concrete suggestions for changing the law. 0 7
On the other side of the theoretical fence are the critics of HOAs
and their covenants. These critics tend to eschew the economic
efficiency argument in favor of a communitarian perspective. They
typically assert that HOAs and their covenants harm both the social
fabric and their individual members. Professor Gerald Frug has
rejected Ellickson's characterization of HOAs as "voluntary," albeit
with little substantive rebuttal. 0 8 Frug disparaged Ellickson's
suggestion that people are empowered to "shop for homeowners
associations" and instead argued that courts should give HOA
covenants the same scrutiny that they apply to governmental laws.1 09
His policy recommendation urged an unspecified "enrichment" of
the democratic process through decentralizing power between both
HOAs and cities and their residents.1o
Perhaps the most vigorous legal critic of HOA covenants in
recent years has been Professor Paula Franzese."' She reasons that
although HOAs may manifest a desire of modern Americans for the
small-town community, 112 today's HOAs fail at this task. Criticizing
the "privatization" of functions, such as regulation of land use, that
used to be purely public, she asserts that HOA rules promote a
"regimentation" of behavior that "do[es] more to destroy community
than to build it."113 HOA covenants demand a "community of the
nice"-with nice meaning a personality that "does not tend to
inspire great originality, depth or tolerance. Nor does it allow much
room for heterogeneity of a sort that might rock the nice boat."11 4

107. See Fennell, supra note 90, at 890 ("I have focused on pointing out problems, while
saying very little about possible solutions.").
108. Frug asserted that Ellickson had made failed to make a "convincing distinction"
between governmental laws and HOA rules. Frug, supra note 96, at 1589. It is unclear why he
chose to place a burden of persuasion on Ellickson's side. Frug's chief empirical point is that the
original covenants in an HOA are often created without direct input from any of the future
residents. Id. at 1590.
109. See id. at 1591 ("I can see no difference at all-no legitimate public/private distinction
at all-between cities and homeowners associations."); id. at 1601 (distinctions "do[] not much
matter to me").
I10. Id.
111. See generally Franzese, Nice, supra note 9; Paula A. Franzese, Does it Take a
Village?: Privatization,Patternsof Restrictiveness and the Demise of Community, 47 VILLA. L.
REv. 553 (2002) [hereinafter Franzese, Village].
112. Franzese, Village, supra note 111, at 557-58, 571-72 (discussing the appeal of HOAs
to those who long for old-fashioned community values).
113. Id. at560.
114. Franzese, Nice, supra note 9, at 338. It is interesting to note that the Community
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Rather, the mushrooming of HOA rules leads, in her view, to an
"inherent distrust" of neighbor and neighbor, each of whom is
constantly on the lookout for even a minor violation of some
restrictive covenant." 5 Such an outcome may not be surprising in a
nation in which personal self-interest, not public spiritedness, seems
to be a long-standing part of the national psyche, as first recognized
by Alexis de Tocqueville in the early nineteenth century.' 16
Franzese does not trust that the housing market will act as a
brake on abuse or an incentive to the liberal commons expostulated
by Heller." 7 She cites a widespread ignorance of rules by new
residents and scoffs at the notion that the agreement to follow HOA
rules is wholly voluntary." 8 Rather, she concludes that the coercive
pursuit of a community for the nice is inherently "exclusionary"
against those who are less affluent and against those who live
differently or who would "rock the boat." 1 9
The criticism of "privatization" has been echoed by Professor
Sheryll Cashin, who asserts that the HOA phenomenon creates a
"potential schism" between those inside and outside the
community. 120 Using the gated HOA community as an example,
Cashin criticizes a "fear of 'other"' as the reason for those who live
inside locked gates to try to engage in what she calls the "civic
secession" of affluent HOA suburban residents from less affluent
America, especially poorer, urban America.12 1 This secession results
in HOA's being "highly homogeneous by income and race,"1 22
although she does not cite statistics that HOA communities are more
segregated than are more traditional affluent suburban
communities. 2 3
Associations Institute, the organization that represents HOAs, places a photomontage on its web
home page that prominently shows two non-white families. See Community Associations
Institute Homepage, supra note 5.
115. Franzese, Nice, supra note 9, at 346; see also Franzese, Village, supra note 111, at
559.
116. Franzese, Village, supra note 111,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 525 (1839)).

at 570 (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,

117. See id. at 562-64.
118. See id. at 562-64, 582 (referring to the ignorance of HOA rules by new residents).
119. Id. at 560.
120. Sheryll D. Cashin, Privatized Communities and the "Secession of the Successful":
Democracy and FairnessBeyond the Gate, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1675, 1676-79 (2001).
121. Id. at 1681-82.
122. Id. at 1679, 1681.
123. See Gillette, supra note 86, at 1397-98 ("Established neighborhoods and even
complete towns or cities (certainly suburbs) tend to sort by income or socioeconomic status,
even without covenants."). For an influential assessment of racial segregation in the United
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Franzese asserts rather boldly-and opaquely-that the goal of a
community should be the development of "trusting communit[y]"
with "social capital" and "shared emotional connection." 1 24 Here,
her critique becomes as theoretical as the applause of the free market
advocates. Despite the breadth of her criticism, Franzese's policy
recommendations for restrictions on HOA rules are rather mild. She
recommends a patchwork of corrective measures, mandatory
mediation for disputes, better disclosure forms, ethics training for
HOA board members, and a sunset provision for covenants so that
the rules favored by one generation must be reconsidered by the
next. 125 While these process-oriented recommendations are each
worthwhile on their own, they are unlikely to amount to a wholesale
revolution in close-knit communities that she appears to espouse.
Although she mentions a potential "bill of rights" for HOA
residents, she was referring to a set of procedural rights, not a list of
substantive rights that covenants cannot infringe. 126
IV. THE DEFERENTIAL LAW OF HOA COVENANTS

This part examines how American law has scrutinized the substance
of HOA covenants. Most state courts have employed a "reasonableness"
test. Despite the apparent appropriateness of such a standard, this test
has failed in either of two possible goals. First, the availability of
judicial review undermines the libertarian position that covenants
should be treated just as any other private contract. Second, the
deference that almost all courts have given to HOA covenants under the
reasonableness test ignores the position that courts should block HOA
rules that intrude on personal liberty. The result is a doctrine of judicial
review that serves little purpose.
A. State Law Standardsof Review ofHOA Rules
The history of the jurisprudence concerning "real" covenants-that
is, concerning land-is one of the most confusing and unsatisfying in all
States, with little attribution to HOA covenants, see generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note
45.
124. See Franzese, Village, supra note 111, at 567-71, 585 (discussing these ideals).
125. See id. at 591-92; Franzese, Nice, supra note 9, at 347-52 (discussing
recommendations for reform).
126. See Franzese, Village, supra note 11l, at 582-83 n.206 (citing Susan F. French, The
Constitution of a Private Residential Government Should Include a Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 345, 346 (1992) (proposing a set of procedurally oriented rights)).
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of Anglo-American law. A historical reason for the development of this
cockeyed doctrine is the misfit between land and contract. Under
traditional English law, with its emphasis on the stability of land
ownership (which, before the modem age, was in effect equivalent to
wealth), land passed from father to eldest son and so on, through the law
of primogeniture. 127 If a landowner wished to restrict the use of land, he
did so through forfeiture language in the deed-the "defeasibility,"
"conditions subsequent," and "determinability" that often restricted the
property in perpetuity,128 and that today linger largely to torment firstyear law students.129 These tools were unique to deeds of real property.
In contrast to the long-term vision of land ownership were mere
"contracts," concerning goods and services, which typically were shortterm transactions. Traditional English law, therefore, with its sharp
divisions between "contract," "tort," and "property" law, contemplated
a minor role for concepts of short-term contract law in the law of real
property.
When modern developers sought to impose nontraditional, urbanoriented restrictions in deeds-such as covenants restricting the use of
the land to residential purposes, without forfeiture as a penaltyEnglish courts were hesitant to merge fully the doctrine of contract law
into the ownership of land. Accordingly, these courts justified the new
forms of deed restrictions by inventing a new term-the "equitable
servitude," 30 which for the most part was simply a covenant by another
name-and by imposing limitations on the reach of these land-based
covenants. Most significantly, the courts imposed the requirement that
these covenants "touch or concern the land" before they could bind
future landowners, even if these landowners were fully aware of the
restrictions when purchasing the land. 13 1 Next, courts held that they

127. See Succession of Luaga, 624 So. 2d 1156, 1181 (La. 1993) (discussing the traditional
English rule).
128. These provisions, which created "determinability"-meaning termination-of land
ownership, were not limited by the English Rule Against Perpetuities, which restricted only
potential future terminations of ownership that sent the land to a third party, through an
executory interest or conditional remainder. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Brandt, 148 P.3d
1069, 1073-75 (2006) (discussing traditional principles of the Rule Against Perpetuities).
129. See RESTATEMENT OF PROP. §§ 44-48 (modem summaries of these restrictions).
130. See Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Chanc. 1848) (establishing that courts of
equity will enforce real covenants by injunctive relief, even if such relief were not available in a
traditional court of law).
131. The most notable modem case on the "touch or concern" requirement was Neponsit
Property Owners' Ass'n v. EmigrantIndustrialSavings Bank, which interpreted the requirement
broadly, thus facilitating the modern housing development. Neponsit Prop. Owners' Ass'n v.
Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 794-98 (N.Y. 1938) (holding that association fee
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would not enforce real covenants that "violated public policy" or were
"arbitrary."l 32 The "public policy" limitation is familiar from contract
law, 13 3 but the "arbitrary" limitation is not. Today, this word is most
commonly employed by American courts in administrative law, under
which governmental actions may be struck down if they are "arbitra 7"
or "capricious" under the federal Administrative Procedure Act.
Because few actions meet the dictionary meanings of these terms, courts
have in effect reinterpreted them for the purpose of judicial review to
mean "unreasonable," in the sense of having no rational justification.13 5
From this principle, courts and state legislatures have chosen to
reinterpret the "arbitrary" standard as a "reasonableness" standard for
reviewing HOA covenants, as explained herein. This is not necessarily a
welcome development. First, the judicial review of governmental
administrative actions under the reasonableness standard typically asks
whether the government has articulated a cogent rationale for its policy
choice in its administrative proceedings.' 3 6 Such a requirement would
not make sense for HOA covenants, which are created by developers
and HOA boards, not governmental agencies; courts have not required
such formal justifications from HOAs.137 Rather, courts have in effect
imposed a test of "reasonableness" that seems similar to the "rational
basis" test for statutes under the U.S. Constitution's "equal protection"
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment-that is, the rule survives
scrutiny unless there is no conceivable rational justification, even if this
conceivable justification was never articulated by the enacting body.13 8
For a closer examination of how courts have applied the
"reasonableness" standard to HOA covenants, let us examine the law of
two large states, Florida and California. These two states, one on the
met the requirement).
132. For example, the Restatement says that a covenant may be set aside if it is "illegal or
unconstitutional, or violates public policy." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES

§ 3.1

(2000). Among other specific grounds for holding a servitude invalid are that it imposes an
unreasonable restraint on alienation, an unreasonable restraint on competition, or is
unconscionable. Id.
133. See, e.g., Lucier v. Williams, 841 A.2d 907 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2004) (contracts
invalid when they violate public policy).
134. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2006).
135. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009) (under
the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2006), a court must uphold
any reasonable agency decision and cannot merely substitute its judgment for that of the
agency).
136. See id.
137. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).
138. Id. at 319-20 (conduct survives rational basis review if it is rational under any
"reasonably conceivable state of facts").
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east coast and one on the west, have been key players in the
development of HOA law, in large part because they have been the two
most prominent focuses of the movement to the Sunbelt over the past
half-century, which has dovetailed with the explosion of HOA
communities. Both states have experienced a great demand for new
construction of housing developments, mostly far from the old central
cities, and both have experienced growing efforts to preserve unique
environmental landscapes and wildlife habitat-most notably wetlands
in Florida and deserts and dry hills in California.
Florida's two landmark pronouncements on the standard for
reviewing HOA covenants both came in connection with the same
development: Hidden Harbour Estates in Martin County. In a 1975 case,
a homeowner challenged the condominium association rule against the
"use of' or "consumption of' alcohol beverages in common areas. 13 9
The trial court imposed a burden on the association to justify its rules,
holding that a rule "must have some reasonable relationship to the
protection of life, property or the general welfare of the residents of the
condominium in order for it to be valid and enforceable."l 40 The Florida
appellate court reversed, reasoning that
inherent in the condominium concept is the principle that to
promote the health, happiness, and peace of mind of the majority
of the unit owners since they are living in such close proximity
and using facilities in common, each unit owner must give up a
certain degree of freedom of choice which he might otherwise
enjoy in separate, privately owned property. Condominium unit
owners comprise a little democratic sub society [sic] of necessity
more restrictive as it pertains to use of condominium property
than may be existent outside the condominium organization. 1
Because the rule was reasonable, the court upheld its application.142
Six years later, the appellate court clarified the standard of review in
another case involving Hidden Harbour Estates. 14 3 In this case, a
homeowner had dug a well to access freshwater, in response to a
139. Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
140. Id. (quoting the unpublished trial court opinion).
141. Id. at 181-82.
142. Id. at 182.
143. Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981). The standards set forth in the 1981 Hidden Harbour Estates decision have been reiterated
by many courts. See, e.g., Yankovski v. Keller, No. 04-1813C, 2004 WL 2451293, at *2 (Mass.
Super. Oct. 25, 2004).
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community limitation on using communal water for lawn-watering.1 4 4
The HOA had a rule that prohibited "temporary or permanent
improvements or alterations" without board approval.1 The board sued
to enjoin the homeowner's use of the well, arguing that individual wells
might pull saltwater into the community's freshwater supply, among
other potential harms.14 6 The court clarified that the standard of review
was whether the rule was "reasonable," noting the policy set forth in the
previous Hidden Harbour Estates opinion about HOA residents'
voluntary choice to give up some freedom.147
The court further distinguished between rules that are imposed in the
HOA's master declaration (and thus are available for all to see before
buying a home) and those adopted by the HOA board later on, perhaps
over the objections of some or many homeowners. 148 If the word
"reasonable" were not already vague enough, the court split the term
into two different applications (with an amusing attempt at precision, in
my view).149 For master declaration covenants, "the restrictions are
clothed with a very strong presumption of validity which arises from the
fact that each individual unit owner purchases his unit knowing of and
accepting the restrictions to be imposed."so In fact, a use restriction in a
declaration of condominium may have a certain degree of
unreasonableness to it, and yet withstand attack in the courts. If it were
otherwise, a unit owner could not rely on the restrictions found in the
declaration of condominium, since such restrictions would be in a
potential condition of continuous flux."' 5 1 The court did clarify when a
rule might display "a certain level of unreasonableness," and how a
court is supposed to distinguish among a fully reasonable rule, one that
is slightly unreasonable, and one that is entirely unreasonable. 15 2
For board-adopted rules, by contrast, reviewing judges should apply
a true "reasonableness" test in order to "somewhat fetter the discretion
Such a standard, the court explained, best
of the board of directors.
assures that governing boards will "enact rules and make decisions that
are reasonably related to the promotion of the health, happiness and

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Basso, 393 So. 2d at 638.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 638-40.
Id at 639-40.
Id.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 639-40.
Id. at 640.
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peace of mind" of the project owners, considered collectively.154 in fact,
the appellate court concluded in this case that the board had not shown
that its concerns-increased salinity, and so on-were borne out by the
homeowner's particular freshwater well. 5 5 Under such a standard of
individualized determination, therefore, the association presumably
would have to allow each homeowner to dig wells, until the point that
the communal wells were spoiled by salt water. 5 6
California law did not clarify its standard of care until 1994, in the
much-publicized case of Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium
57
Association.1
There, the California Supreme Court applied a
California statute (still extant) which states that HOA covenants in the
master declaration are enforceable "unless unreasonable."' 5 8 The
plaintiff, who had three cats-Boo Boo, Dockers, and Tulipchallenged her HOA covenant that barred pets, arguing that the cats
stayed indoors, were well-behaved, and did not bother anyone; thus, she
reasoned, it was unreasonable to apply the no-pet rule to her.1 59 The
California court cited approvingly Florida's 1981 Hidden Harbour
Estates decision, but then questioned the rationale, expressed by the
Florida court, that each challenge should be judged by its own merits:
Refusing to enforce the CC&R's contained in a recorded
declaration, or enforcing them only after protracted litigation that
would require justification of their application on a case-by-case
basis, would impose great strain on the social fabric of the
common interest development. It would frustrate owners who had
purchased their units in reliance on the CC&R's. It would put the
owners and the homeowners association in the difficult and
divisive position of deciding whether particular CC&R's should
be applied to a particular owner. Here, for example, deciding
whether a particular animal is "confined to an owner's unit and
create[s] no noise, odor, or nuisance" is a fact-intensive
determination that can only be made by examining in detail the
behavior of the particular animal and the behavior of the
particular owner. Homeowners associations are ill-equipped to
make such investigations, and any decision they might make in a

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
See id.
Id. at 638-41.
878 P.2d 1275 (1994).
Id. at 1278-1292; CAL. CIV. CODE
Nahrstedt,878 P.2d at 1277-78.

§ 1354 (1994).
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particular case could be divisive or subject to claims of

partiality. 160
Rather, the California court reasoned, imposing a high burden on a
homeowner under a "reasonableness" standard is better for the
community as a whole:
When courts accord a presumption of validity to all such
recorded use restrictions and measure them against deferential
standards of equitable servitude law, it discourages lawsuits by
owners of individual units seeking personal exemptions from the
restrictions. This also promotes stability and predictability in two
ways. It provides substantial assurance to prospective
condominium purchasers that they may rely with confidence on
the promises embodied in the project's recorded CC&R's. And it
protects all owners in the planned development from
unanticipated increases in association fees to fund the defense of
legal challenges to recorded restrictions.' 61
More recent California cases have reaffirmed Nahrstedt's great
deference to HOA covenants; in a recent case, the court upheld a no-pet
rule even though it was adopted by the board after the master
declaration. 162 Such covenants should be approved unless they are
"arbitrary" or "violate public policy," the California court held.' 6 3 Other
courts have interpreted "reasonableness" with the language of
deferential rational basis test.164 In one case, rejecting a challenge to an
HOA rule that required an "art jury" to pass on the plaintiffs proposal
to add a turret and other features to his house, the California court
concluded that, to be "arbitrary," a rule must "bear ... no rational

relationship to the protection, preservation, operation or purpose of the

affected land." 16 5
In sum, therefore, the state law of judicial review of HOA rules is
one of great deference. This standard emphasizes the putative value of
enforcing rules of private governments, entered into voluntarily by
those who choose to join an HOA community. At the same time, the

160.
161.
162.
2004).
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 1288-89.
Id. at 1287-88.
Villa DeLas Palmas Homeowners Ass'n v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d 1223, 1224-25 (Cal.
Id. at 1224.
Dolan-King v. Rancho Santa Fe Ass'n, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (App. 4th Dist. 2000).
Id. at 288 (citing Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d 1275 (1994)).
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"reasonableness" standard does allow a homeowner to argue in court
that a rule is "arbitrary," "violates public policy," or otherwise is
"unreasonable," perhaps on a case-by-case basis. These are all very
amorphous exceptions-rarely wielded with much effect by
homeowners-to the general rule that presumes validity.
As a result, we are left with an unsteady standard for review of HOA
covenants. Free-market critics, such as Professor Richard Epstein, have
criticized both the easy availability of judicial review and the traditional
"touch and concern" requirement.' 6 6 He saw HOA rules as simply a
modern form of private contract, and argued forcefully that human
affairs will run more smoothly and more efficiently if everyone knows
and expects that private contracts will be enforced.16 Even the
opportunity for a resident to challenge a covenant in court will cost
money and disrupt the expectations of other residents. Accordingly, he
argued that covenants should be viewed as fully enforceable private
contracts-in other words, with a powerful presumption of legality, and
only a rare chance of being overturned.16 8
Another criticism of the current common law is that none of the
leading state court cases has suggested that homeowners do or should
possess some fundamental rights of liberty that may override HOA
rules. Nor have the cases relied on any of the economic or sociological
arguments for suspecting that HOA rules might not accurately reflect
the desires of a majority of the residents. For an expression of these
concerns, we must look elsewhere.
B. Asserting IndividualRights: The Restatement and Other Critics
First, state legislatures have responded in piecemeal fashion to
claims of unfairness or invasion of personal freedom asserted by
aggrieved residents. For example, largely in response to the publicity
surrounding Nahrstedt, the California legislature made it unlawful for
HOA rules adopted after 2001 (too late to help Nahrstedt, Boo-Boo
Dockers, and Tulip!) to forbid a resident from keeping one pet.163
California also enacted a provision that gives a homeowner a "right,"
regardless of HOA rules, to display one small American flag outside the

166. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906,

909-13 (1988) (criticizing arguments for not enforcing certain covenants against successors of
original promisors and calling such as an "unmitigated disaster").
167. Id. at 911-14.
168. Id. at 915-25.

169. CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 1360.5 (2002) (right to one pet, for HOAs adopted after 2001).
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home.170 In Florida, the state code has been amended to give a
homeowner the right to have a "Florida-friendly" lawn of water-tolerant
plants, instead of the green-grass-lawn requirements that are common in
Florida but difficult to attain in the sandy, sun-baked soils that exist
throughout much of the state.171 Other states have enacted statutory
provisions that override HOA rules and give a grab bag of "rights" to
residents.17 2 There is little consistency, rhyme, or reason to these
statutory enactments, other than, perhaps, a response to applications that
have captured the fancy of state legislators from time to time.
Next, the American Law Institute's Restatement of Property has
taken a somewhat tougher line on HOA covenants than have most state
courts. The Restatement's reporter for the division on Servitudes,
Professor Susan French, has been critical of HOA rules, has asserted
that HOA boards are often poorly educated as to their tasks, and often
suffer from a desire to enforce every infraction, no matter how minor,
which stands in contrast to the discretion employed by government.173 A
typical HOA "lacks the checks and balances that typically constrain
cities from abusing their residents," she has argued. 174
The current Restatement reflects French's skepticism of the idea that
the free market will result in a sensible set of rules that reflect the
preferences of community residents.' 7 5 The Restatement would require
common-interest communities to "treat members fairly" and "act
reasonably in the exercising of its discretionary powers of rulemaking,

170. Id. § 1353.5 (right to display a flag, but specifying the permissible materials for the
flag). Many states have enacted rights to display a flag at HOAs. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33-1808 (2008) (right to display a U.S., state, POW/MIA, or American Indian nations
flag); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/103.30 (2009) (American or military flag); 44 PA. CONS. STAT.

§ 48.1 (2009) (general right to display a flag at one's residence, unless in violation of land use
laws).
171. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.3075(4)(a) (2009).
172. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-119 (2009) (right to place solar panel on
the roof, regardless of HOA rules); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-3-121(2) (2009) (right to a "political
sign"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.38.034 (2009) (right to place political signs in an HOA
yard before an election).
173. See Susan F. French, Making Common Interest Communities Work: The Next Step, 37
URB. LAw. 359, 362-69 (2005). Among other recommendations is that states should give greater
administrative support to HOA board to make better decisions. Id. at 362, 368.
174. Id. at 365. Other commentators have suggested the process-oriented solution of
requiring major disputes between HOAs and residents to be decided by an ombudsman. See,
e.g., Edward D. Hannaman, Homeowner Association Problems and Solutions, 5 RUTGERS J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 699 (2008). This solution would help factual disputes, of course, but would not
directly affect the legal validity of intrusive covenants.
175. RESTATEMENT

communities).

(THIRD) OF PROP.:

SERVITUDES

§ 6 (2000) (common-interest
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enforcement, and design-control powers," although the burden would
remain on challengers to the rules to prove that the association acted

unlawfully. 176
The Restatement would constrain HOA covenants to those types of
harms that resemble nuisances. Under the traditional common law
doctrine of the tort of nuisance, a landowner can be restrained from
engaging in conduct that "unreasonabl[y] interfere[s] with the use or
enjoyment" of another person's property. 17 7 Thus, a court can find a
nuisance when a suburbanite plays music in the backyard all night
long,"7 or an apartment building runs a very noisy industrial air
conditioner close to a single-family house,17 or a factory emits
unusually smelly air pollution near a residential community.so In each
case, a property owner whose enjoyment of property is significantly
impaired may assert an actionable claim. Whether the annoying conduct
rises to the level of a nuisance and whether relief is granted (injunctive
relief is the traditional remedy, although money damages are an
alternative 181) is left to the discretion of the court. Nuisance is an
extraordinarily "elastic" tort; courts often consider a wide range of
circumstances in deciding whether the defendant's conduct is
"unreasonable" (annoying conduct is typically more excusable in rural
areas, for example) and often balance the presumed benefit of the
defendant's conduct against the harm to the plaintiff in determining
whether a remedy is warranted.18 2 A unifying principle, however, is that
the defendant must show a "significant" injury; conduct that is merely
mildly annoying does not constitute an actionable nuisance.
Significantly, the nuisance doctrine does not allow recovery simply

176. Id. § 6.13(1).
177. See, e.g., Parks Hiway Enter. LLC v. CEM Leasing, Inc., 995 P.2d 657, 666 (Ala.
2000) (defining a nuisance as the substantial and unreasonable interference with the use or
enjoyment of property).
178. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 53 (2009) ("Noise may be a nuisance where it is of such a
character as to be productive of actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of
ordinary sensibilities.").
179. See, e.g., Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz, 500 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)
(loud apartment building air conditioner constituted an actionable nuisance).
180. See, e.g., Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682 (1953)
(pollution from oil refinery was an actionable nuisance).
181. See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 705-06 (Ariz.
1972) (en banc) (damages are a potential remedy when the injury is slight).
182. See Boomer v. AtI. Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970) (discussing
the balancing of equities between the desires of the plaintiff and defendant).
183. E.g., Mable Cleary Trust v. Edward-Marlah Muzyl Trust, 686 N.W.2d 770, 787
(Mich. App. 2004).
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because a neighbor does not like or does not approve of what another
resident is doing.1 84
In line with this traditional law of nuisance, the Restatement would
authorize a "common-interest community" 85 to "govern the use of
individually-owned property to protect the common property." 86
Moreover, a community would be authorized to "adopt reasonable rules
designed to ...

protect community members from unreasonable

interference in the enjoyment of their individual lots or units and the
roperty by use of other individually owned lots or
common
units...

."

The power to restrict "the use or occupancy of, or

behavior within" homes would be permitted only if the master
declaration specially authorized such rules.' 8 8
The effort to limit HOA rules to those that resemble the abatement of
nuisances is apparent by the revealing examples provided by the ALI.
The Restatement would authorize HOA rules that restricted noise from
a communal pool after 10 p.m.,1 89 required dogs to be kept on a leash in
the community, 190 and prohibited garbage disposals that posed a threat
to an antiquated communal plumbing system. 191 Rules against more
minor annoyances, however, would not be authorized. For example, an
illustration states that a rule against parking in driveways overnight
would not be permissible because "it is not reasonably necessary to
protect the common property or to protect the other owners' interests in
reasonable use and enjoyment of their property or the common
property." 92 A covenant that barred use of the pool to those over the
age of 30 would not be allowed, even in a community where nearly all
members are over 30, because it "discriminates against a minority" and
"is not the only means to provide safety . .. and minimize spill-over

effects of pool usage."

93

Similarly, a rule against cohabitation by

184. See, e.g., Miller v. Rohling, 720 N.W.2d 562, 567 (Iowa 2006) (nuisance claims must
be judged by a "normal-person," or objective, standard).
185. The term "common-interest community" is defined as "a real-estate development or
neighborhood in which individually owned lots or units are burdened by" restrictive covenants.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES

§ 6.2(1). For purpose of this Article's

discussion, I use the narrower but more familiar term homeowners association (HOA) to be
equivalent to the term "common-interest community" as used in the Restatement.
186. Id. § 6.7(l)(b).
187. Id. § 6.7(2)(a).
188. Id. § 6.7(3).
189. Id. § 6.7 cmt. c. illus. 1.
190. Id. § 6.7 cmt. c., illus. 4.
191. Id. § 6.7 cmt. d, illus. 7.
192. Id. § 6.7 cmt. e, illus. 11.
193. Id. § 6.7 cmt. c, illus. 2.
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unmarried couples would not be permitted because such a rule does not
affect other's "use and enjoyment of their property."l 94
Most strikingly, the Restatement would frown upon rules governing
aesthetics. Unless the power was specifically authorized by the master
declaration, HOAs could not restrict "structures or landscaping" on lots,
nor the "design, materials, colors, or plants" at each home.195 An
illustration suggests that an HOA could not adopt, without authorization
in the declaration, a rule that reuired the exterior of houses to painted
one of five specified colors. 19 Such a rule would be invalid, the
Restatement opines, because it is "not reasonably necessary to prevent
damage to the common property."l 9 7
As may readily be seen, the Restatement would impose far tighter
restrictions on HOA covenants than state courts typically have.' 9 The
Restatement plainly has been influenced by the law of nuisance, which
mobilizes the machinery of tort relief only for significant and
unreasonable interferences with property enjoyment. But this does not
mean the Restatement approach makes sense as a matter of policy. First,
the Restatement fails to address the argument that HOA rules may be
more restrictive because they are the voluntary products of free contract
and private democratic government; residents may choose an HOA
precisely because they desire to limit their neighbors' conduct in a more
intrusive manner than they could obtain through tort law. Moreover, the
Restatement's illustrations appear to require an HOA to use the leastinvasive means of achieving a goal.19 9 While such a duty is imposed by
constitutional law governing free speech,2 0 0 this duty is not clarified by
the Restatement itself. Nonetheless, if the Restatement is not necessarily
a model for reform of HOA law, it signals a path for further inquiry.
This path is the idea that certain HOA covenants should be off limits
when they interfere with fundamental liberty rights of residents,
regardless of whether a majority of the HOA residents would like to
restrict these rights.

194. Id. § 6.7 cmt. e, illus. 14.
195. Id. § 6.9.
196. Id. § 6.7 cmt. d, illus. 9.
197. Id.
198. But see supra text accompanying notes 214-19.
199. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 218-19 (appearing to impose a duty to
choose a less intrusive means of achieving a goal).
200. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 798-99 (1989). Government may
regulate the "time, place, or manner" of speech, but it must narrowly tailor the regulation to
meet the government's interest. Id.
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For a final word in this part on this advocacy of liberty rights,
consider a case that in 2006201 generated much commentary and briefly
threatened to shake up the law of the HOA covenants.2 0 2 In Committee
for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Association, a

New Jersey appellate court employed the state constitution to stake out
new gound for asserting a resident's "expressive rights" to trump HOA
rules. 03 The New Jersey constitution sets forth rights to "speak, write
and publish," without necessarily limiting this right to governmental
constraints. 0 Dissident residents at the Twin Rivers community
argued, among a host of claims, that the state constitution gave them the
right to override their HOA rules concerning signs on lawns, restricting
the use of public spaces in the community, giving the HOA board
control over the local newsletter, and weighting voting rights based on

the value of property. 205
Setting aside the argument that joining the HOA was voluntary, the
appellate court held that "any regulation of a fundamental right engages
the public interest by definition, especially where the regulator is
functionally equivalent to a governmental body in its impact upon the
affected public." 20 6 The HOA community resembled a town and was
functionally equivalent to a government in many respects, the court
concluded. 07 Salient among the fundamental rights, it noted, is the right
of free expression:

201. See Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowner's Ass'n, 890 A. 2d
947 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), rev'd, 929 A. 2d 1060 (N.J. 2007).
202. See, e.g., Mark Perkiss, Dissident Homeowners Get a Voice, NJ.COM, Feb. 8, 2006,
http://swagman.typepad.com/poagovernance/files/njtrentontimes60208_twinrivers.html;
Paula Franzese & Margaret Bar-Akiva, Homeowners Association Can't Bar Democracy, STARLEDGER, Feb. 20, 2006, http://hoanewsnetwork.com/articles/Homeowner%20boards%20
can't%20exclude%20democracy.pdf (commentary by critics of HOA rules).
203. Twin Rivers, 890 A.2d at 951.
204. N.J. CONST. art. 1, 1 6 (1947). More specifically, the New Jersey Constitution states
that: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right." Id. Although this provision echoes the U.S.
Constitution's First Amendment's protection that "no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge
the liberty of speech or the press," absence of a reference to the "government" in New Jersey's
provision has led New Jersey courts to conclude that the provision is not limited to
governmental restraints. State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 632-33 (N.J. 1980). The state language
is "more sweeping in scope than the language of the First Amendment [of the U.S.
Constitution]," and had been imposed to restrict even certain private property owners that open
their land to the public. Id. at 626, 628-30 (reversing a conviction of trespassing against a man
who had distributed political literature on the campus of Princeton University).
205. Twin Rivers, 890 A.2d at 951-52.
206. Id. at 963.
207. See also id. at 954 (referring to the testimony of HOA critic Evan McKenzie).
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The supremacy of free speech is a significant element of the
required balance [between private government and individual
rights]. Freedom of speech 'occupies a preferred position in our
system of constitutionally-protected interests . . . .' It follows that
fundamental rights exercises, including free speech, must be
protected as fully as they always have been, even where modem
societal developments have created new relationships or have
changed old ones. Expressive exercises, especially those bearing
upon real and legitimate community issues, should not be
silenced or subject to undue limitation because of change in
residential [living] arrangements, such as where lifestyle issues
are governed or administered by community associations in
addition to being regulated by governmental entities.20
The appellate court remanded to the lower court, directing the lower
court to apply state constitutional freedoms of expression to HOA
residents against their covenants.2 0 9
Had the much-discussed appellate ruling in Twin Rivers stood, it
might have signaled a turning point in judicial review of HOA rules,
away from great deference and toward a more jaundiced and
scrutinizing eye, at least in terms of free expression or other putatively
fundamental rights. 2 10 In this sense, it might have been an echo of the
famous rulings in the epic Mt. Laurel litigation of the 1970s and 1980s.
In Mt. Laurel, the New Jersey courts used the state constitution to bring
to the nation's attention the problem of exclusionary zoning laws that
mandated single-family housing and its harmful effects on the
availability of low-cost housing, especially in the suburbs.2 1 1 These
New Jersey holdings spurred many states and localities to scrutinize
more closely their zoning laws and to address the problem of
"affordable" and "workforce" housing.2 12 However, Twin Rivers did not

208. Id. at 959-60 (quoting Schmid, 423 A.2d at 615) (internal citation omitted).
209. Id. at 971.
210. Id.
211. See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel Township, 336 A.2d 713, 734
(N.J. 1975) (concluding that growing localities must change land use laws to allow for a "fair
share" of low-cost housing), laterproceedings,456 A.2d 390, 441-42 (N.J. 1983) (imposing the
additional step of requiring localities to take affirmative measures to ensure the construction of
low-cost housing); see generally CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE (1998) (discussing
the Mt. Laurel epic and its politics).
212. The New Jersey legislature responded to the Mt. Laurel requirement by enacting a
Fair Housing Act to impose a "fair share" requirement, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-302 (2006),
through the state Council on Affordable Housing, id. § 52:27D-305 (2006). Other states
followed with similar requirements, of varying strengths, to require localities to assess, and
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repeat this incentive. A year after the appellate holding in Twin Rivers,
the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, focusing not on the importance
of free expression, but on the fact that "the relationship between the
[HOA] and the homeowners is a contractual one, formalized in
reasonable covenants that appear in all the deeds." 2 13 Although the state
constitution imposes some restraint on actors beyond the government,
the high court also noted that "[w]e do not interfere lightly with private
property rights;" in this case, "in balancing plaintiffs' expressional
rights against the [HOA]'s private property interest, the Associations'
polices do not violate the free" expression rights.2 14 Accordingly, Twin
Rivers is not precedent for a bill of rights for HOA residents. But it
serves as an inspiration into further inquiry as to whether homeowners
should hold certain rights on which HOA covenants may not tread.
V. CREATING A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR HOA RESIDENTS

In this part, I endeavor to create a "bill of rights" for HOA residents
that HOAs cannot infringe. Although others have attempted to delineate
such a list of rights, for the most part these previous efforts have
promoted procedural rights for residents-the right to receive notice of
HOA board meetings, the right to speak at such meetings, and
procedures for the elections of HOA boards. 2 15 While useful, these
rights serve a radically different purpose than that served by many of
the federal constitutional bill of rights. Procedural rights for HOA
residents appear to be predicated on the assumption that the rules of an
HOA are the worthy result of voluntary contract and private
government, and that procedures alone may ensure that these rules are
the reflection of HOA majoritarian democracy. By contrast, the
substantive constitutional rights are counter-majoritarian. Many of the
federal constitutional rights, particularly the first ten amendments, are
substantive rights. They impose a set of subject-matter restrictions on
governmental action-no infringement of free speech, freedom of
religion, no search or seizure without probable cause, a qualified right to

provide for, low-cost housing needs. See, e.g., 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 67/5 (2004); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 163.3177 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 473.859 (2009).
213. Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 929 A.2d 1060,
1073 (N.J. 2007).
214. Id. at 1074.
215. See, e.g., David A. Kahne, A Bill of Rights for Homeowners in Associations
(sponsored by the American Association of Retired Persons), http://www.cctj.net/HOAbillintro.
htm. This "bill of rights" would grant rights that are largely procedural in nature. Id.
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bear arms-regardless of the majoritarian desires of a republican
government or of the people at any point in time.
It is beyond the scope of this work to justify a set of countermajoritarian rights; however, among the reasons for such rights are the
avoidance of laws enacted by temporary majorities, the protection
against emotionally driven majority rules, and, perhaps most
significantly, a recognition of fundamental human liberties that
government may not violate.2 1 6 If one accepts any or all of these reasons
for a set of rights against the rules of public government, one might well
accept that some, if not all, of these rationales apply to HOA covenants
created by private governments. One crucial difference is that the
decision to be bound by HOA rules is somewhat voluntary. Even if one
accepts the criticism that limited geography and imperfect information
make the choice of an HOA community not wholly voluntary, however,
the choice is undoubtedly more voluntary than, say, the choice of living
under the laws of the United States of America. On the other side are
the economic and behavioral arguments, raised by Fennell, Franzese,
French, and others, that cast doubt on the efficiency of HOA covenants
to reflect accurately and fairly the full range of desires of their
residents. 218 Such potential inefficiencies may serve as a further
justification for the assertion of individual rights.
In any event, the HOA bill of rights created here is shaped by a
number of principles that this Article has already identified. First is the
traditional tort law of nuisance. For centuries, nuisance law has
distinguished between, on the one hand, conduct that significantly
harms others across property boundaries and is unreasonable under the
circumstances-an actionable nuisance-and, on the other hand, those

216. The literature on the philosophy of rights is extensive. Perhaps one of the most notable
works is RONALD DwoluIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977), in which Dworkin contends that

rights do and should exist superior to the desires of the majority.
217. Persons born in the United States are automatically bound by its laws with no
"choice" involved. It is a great stretch to say that a citizen who refrains from immigrating to
another country as an adult has voluntarily "chosen" to be bound by American law, as opposed
to German law or Thai law (or, perhaps, in the twenty-second century, Martian law?). The
Tieboutian model of the ability to "shop for government" far stretches beyond the breaking
point. There traditionally has been a freer choice in residences, in that even young adults who
have been reared in an HOA community have had the choice, when they are emancipated, to
live elsewhere. In a region where HOAs are the dominant form of residence, however, the
notion that a person has "chosen" an HOA may make as little sense as saying a young nativeborn American has "chosen" to be bound by American federal law.
218. For a discussion of the academic criticism of HOA covenants and the debate over
whether they are indeed wholly voluntary contracts that reflect the desires of the majority, see
supraPart III.
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more minor cross-boundary annoyances that either are too small to
justify legal relief or are justified by the benefit created by the offending
conduct. To the extent that a category of conduct resembles a nuisance,
the greater the justification for approving HOA rules that target such
conduct; to the extent that the conduct resembles minor annoyances for
which the common law would offer no relief, the relatively stronger the
argument for protecting such conduct under a system of rights.
Second, the HOA bill of rights is informed by the critique of
scholars such as Fennell, Franzese, and French, who have suggested
structural, economic, and social reasons why HOA rules sometimes do
not reflect either the true desires of the residents or may impose unwise
policy. 2 19 To the extent that a category of HOA covenants implicates
these critiques, the stronger the argument for allowing contravention by
an HOA bill of rights.
Finally, the bill of rights is shaped by the recognition, as stated in the
ill-starred Twin Rivers decision and elsewhere, that privileges of free
expression hold a special and prominent place among the panoply of
rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has often asserted that free speech and
related rights are the "most important" of the constitutional rights.2 2 0
There may be many reasons for this conclusion. Speech, assembly, and
religion are protected by the First Amendment, which gives them
Moreover, these expressions of human feelings appear
prominence.
to be personal, and inherent in the concept of rights is a tolerance of
other's opinions; as a category, these rights are perhaps less likely to
interfere with another's rights. 2 Finally, issues of speech, expression,

219. See supraPart III.
220. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 503
(2007) (Alito, J., concurring) ("It is perhaps our most important constitutional task to assure
freedom of political speech."); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 368 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("Even the most important governmental purpose cannot justify a regulation that
unduly burdens First Amendment liberties").
221. The founders did not intend, however, for this to be the "first" amendment in the
sequence. As originally drafted, the first two amendments addressed the apportionment of
representatives in Congress and limitations on Congress's raising its own pay (eventually
ratified in 1992 as the 27th amendment). These two amendments were not ratified by the states
in the 1790s, leaving the amendment concerning free speech and other freedoms in the "first"
position. See Library of Congress, Bill of Rights, http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/
billofrights.html. It is interesting to speculate whether the American law of individual rights
might have been shaped differently had these rights been "third amendment" rights.
222. Dean Harry Wellington wrote: "Intuition at first may suggest that an individual ought
to have more freedom to speak than he has liberty in other areas. There would seem to be some
truth in the adage, 'sticks and stones can break my bones, but words will never hurt me."' Harry
Wellington, On Freedom ofExpression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1106-07 (1979). But he added: "Yet
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and religion seem close to the core of the human psyche, which gives
them special resonance in the realm of human dignity.
A bill of rights for HOA residents is created here by examining,
seriatim, each of the relevant amendments in the U.S. Constitution's
Bill of Rights. It is conceded that my suggestions as to a set of rights are
informed by personal opinion, as well as precedent and logic. The point
of this discussion is not to create an immutable and non-amendable
tablet of rights, but perhaps to spark a discussion of what rights should,
or should not, trump HOA covenants, through an enactment of state
legislatures.
A. Freedom of Speech and Expression
Federal courts have made clear that the First Amendment's right of
free speech is zealously guarded, even to include conduct that criticizes
judges and other governmental officials, 2 23 advocates general
lawlessness, 224 offers false information, 22 5 and constitutes speech that
would offend an average person.226 Even non-verbal conduct that
expresses political views, such as burning an American flag, is
protected.2
Less protected is commercial speech2 2 8 or speech that is sexually
Moreover, government may regulate in a manner that is
obscene.
speech often hurts. It can offend, injure reputation, fan prejudice or passion, and ignite the
world." Id. John Stuart Mill espoused the classic libertarian argument that government should
intervene only when conduct hurts another. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 145-401 (R. McCallum ed. 1946) (1859).

223. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (reversing contempt conviction
of newspaper writers for criticizing judge's opinion).
224. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (reversing convictions of Ku
Klux Klan members who vaguely advocated unlawful activity, and holding that penalties on
speech are allowed only when "advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
225. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (a claim for libel brought by a
public official cannot succeed unless the public figure shows "actual malice" in the speech, in
order not to avoid "chilling" of speech).
226. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing conviction of antiwar
activist who wore in a courthouse a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft"); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversing conviction of speaker who played a phonograph
record in public that attacked Roman Catholics); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978)
(holding unconstitutional a city ordinance designed to prevent American Nazis from holding a
march in the heavily Jewish city of Skokie, Ill.), requestfor stay denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978).
227. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 397 (1989).
228. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (granting commercial speech to some but not full first amendment protraction); Martin
Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113, 114-51
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"content-neutral," that is, the regulation does not target the content of
the speech but instead regulates the time, place, and manner of the
speech. If the regulation is content-neutral, it must be supported by a
legitimate government interest. 2 30 Thus, a law may prevent a sound
truck from broadcasting loud noises, even about political matters, in the
middle of the night,2 1 but may not prohibit people from ringing
doorbells during the day to distribute political literature. 232 Although the
government ma exclude free speech conduct on public land in certain
circumstances,2 it must be very tolerant of free speech and expression
in places generally open to the public, such as sidewalks, streets, and
public parks.2 3 4
Less common are lawsuits asserting free speech claims against
private property owners because the First Amendment generally bars
only government, not private conduct.2 3 5 In an unusual but muchdiscussed opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Marsh v. Alabama in
1946 that constitutional protections such as free speech applied in a
"company town." 236 The rationale was, in effect, that if a private
company acts like a town, then persons within the town must hold rights
against the company just as if it were a town government. If this
simplistic rationale were applied to HOAs, it would end our analysis.

(1981) (discussing and scrutinizing the distinction).
229. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) ("[O]bscene material is unprotected
by the First Amendment.").
230. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (emphasizing the practical reasons
for regulating speech in a content-natural manner).
231. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 82-83 (1949).
232. Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
233. See, e.g., Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (government can criminalize
marching when it blocks access to a government building); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288 (1983) (upholding law against sleeping on the National Mall in
Washington, even by a protesting group).
234. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (invalidating a federal law that
limited displays on the sidewalks in front of the U.S. Supreme Court building because it was not
"narrowly tailored" to allow as much speech as practicable); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S.
147, 160 (1939) (holding invalid a city law that prohibited distribution of leaflets on the public
streets).
235. The First Amendment refers only to a "law" by "Congress." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
But the rights have imposed on state governments through the incorporation doctrine, via the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99
(1908) (concluding that some of the bill of rights applies to the states because to deny them
would violate "due process"); see generally Charles Fairman, Does the FourteenthAmendment
Incorporatethe Bill ofRights? The OriginalUnderstanding,2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
236. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946). The town, Chickasaw, AL (outside
Mobile) was owned and run by the Gulf Shipbuilding Co. Id at 502-04. The plaintiff distributed
Jehovah's Witness materials on sidewalks of the town until her arrest. Id. at 503-04.
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Indeed, some discussions of HOA rules begin with the hope of Marsh,
as a straightforward way of "incorporating" constitutional rights against
HOAs.2 3 But Marsh is far too blunt a tool. It was a unique holding
explained in part by the times (immediately after World War II), by the
undercurrent of the exploitative nature of company towns, the fact that
the town was freely open to the public, and the disturbing fact that the
plaintiff, who did not work for the company, was peacefully distributing
religious literature until she was arrested and prosecuted for
trespassing.2 3 8
In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to extend Marsh to the
modem-day equivalent of the company town-the shopping center. In
Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner2 3 9 and Hudgens v. National Labor

Relations Board,2 4 0 the Court concluded that there is no individual
federal right to disseminate political leaflets or picket for labor unions in
shopping malls. Indeed, HOAs may be distinguished from the company
town in Marsh by the fact that HOAs are usually well-marked as being
a "private community" and do not hold all the attributes of a town
govermnent. Perhaps the most significant distinction between the
speaker in Marsh and the HOA resident is the latter has voluntarily
joined the private association through a contract that limits the
homeowner's freedom. In the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in
Twin Rivers, the Court implicitly rejected application of Marsh to the
HOA. 2 4 1 Accordingly, I conclude that Marsh is a dead end as a matter
of direct constitutional precedent, although not as a guide to potential
state legislation.
Perhaps more on point are the limited number of cases in which
governments have sought to regulate speech at private residences. Such

237. See, e.g., Chadderdon, supra note 6, at 247-50 (discussing the potential application of
Marsh to HOAs covenants).
238. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503-04.
239. 407 U.S. 551, 565 (1972) (distinguishing Marsh on the basis that a shopping center
does not hold all the attributes of a city government).
240. 424 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1976). The absence of a federal right does not mean that state
constitutions may not impose free speech rights on private property. As discussed in the Twins
Rivers case infra, the New Jersey Constitution grants some rights to speech on quasi-public
property; in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980), the U.S. Supreme
Court did not interfere with a California court's constitutional holding that granted the right to
speech and petition at shopping centers.
241. See Comm. For a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 929 A.2d
1060, 1066-67 (2007) (noting implicitly that Marsh appears to be limited to its specific facts,
citing the shopping mall cases). For a survey of arguments advocating that an HOA should be
treated as if it were a government, see Lara Womack & Douglas Timmons, Homeowner
Associations:Are They Private Governments?, 29 REAL EST. L.J. 322 (2001).
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cases are rare because of the obvious constitutional perils of such
regulation. In City ofLadue v. Gilleo,242 an affluent suburb of St. Louis
passed an ordinance that banned signs on residential property, including
those merely placed in the window of a home.2 4 3 The city justified the
restriction in a manner that would be familiar to many HOA residentsthat signs would "create ugliness," cause "visual blight and clutter,"
"tarnish the natural beauty of the landscape as well as the residential
and commercial architecture," pose "safety and traffic hazards to
motorists pedestrians, and children," and, of course, "impair property
values."2 4 A resident who sought to display a sign opposing the 1991
war against Iraq challenged the ordinance, arguing that it violated her
right to free speech. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the
homeowner, stating that:
A special respect for individual liberty in the home has long
been part of our culture and our law; that principle has special
resonance when the government seeks to constrain a person's
ability to speak there..

..

Whereas the government's need to

mediate among various competing uses, including expressive
ones, for public streets and facilities is constant and unavoidable,
its need to regulate245temperate speech from the home is surely
much less pressing.
Indeed, "[d]isplaying a sign from one's own residence often carries a
message quite distinct from placing the same sign someplace else, or
conveying the same text or picture by other means. Precisely because of
such signs provide information about the identity of the
their location,
24 6

'speaker."'

Accordingly, a state legislature that sought to create a bill of rights
for HOA residents would do well to employ both the precedent and
policies behind the existing law of free speech. First, such a statutory
right would recognize that the expression of personal ideas is especially
significant at and inside one's home. Second, the right would recognize
that this free expression may be bounded by the law of nuisance, which

242. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
243. Id. at 46-47.
244. Id. at 47 (quoting the city ordinance).
245. Id. at 58 (internal citations omitted).
246. Id. at 56. Although the city had striven to be content-neutral, its ordinance was far too
broad to address traffic or safety concerns; such problems could be addressed by much narrower
rules such as limiting signs that were immediately adjacent to the street or that blocked views of
intersections. See id. at 58-59.
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protects neighbors from impairment of their property enjoyment,
especially for environmental intrusions such as noises, smells, and
vibrations. Third, the right would acknowledge that membership in an
HOA community is somewhat voluntary and that the existence of
mutually binding covenants involves some release of the right to free
conduct.
Consider the application of such a potential right in three frequent
areas of disagreement at HOAs: signs, aesthetics, and accessories. Each
of these forms of conduct implicates interesting questions of rights and
responsibilities at an HOA community.
Signs can express the purest form of political speech, as in Gilleo;
they can also constitute an annoyance, as in a hypothetical case of a
resident who places a large abusive sign directed at a neighbor near
their joint property boundary. Because of the potential for abuse, or at
least annoyance, it is common for HOAs to ban all or nearly all signs
from residences, as in the case of the Florida woman who was barred
from displayin a sign that cheered the troops in Iraq, which included
her husband.2 4 If a legislature were to assign some rights to an HOA
resident, however, the expression of political views at the home would
seem to be the most sensible and fundamental place to start. At the same
time, such a recognition of a right to expression could be crafted so as to
minimize the adverse aesthetic and annoyance effects on neighbors,
whose property values may be diminished by a "cluttered" yard next
door; indeed, these neighbors may have chosen an HOA community in
part because of a desire to live in a community in which all residents are
bound by such mutual restraints.
In contrast to signs, the aesthetics of a home, such as landscaping or
paint color, rarely reflect the expression of core, political, First
Amendment values. 24 8 Nonetheless, they do reflect the expression of
personality. Moreover, the requirement of traditional aesthetics might
be seen as a prime example of the overly regulatory "busybody"
attribute of HOA rules, which do not necessarily reflect deeply held
desires of a majority of the voluntary community.249

247. See Hayes, supra note 3.
248. It might be rare, for example, for a Republican to plant a garden of blue irises or
penstemons to broadcast his or her political values! However, in Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz,
the plaintiffs argued that their creation of a "liberty garden" (the property) was "an expression of
their belief that individual liberty and ecological health are inseparable." Shaw v. County of
Santa Cruz, 88 Cal. Rptr. 186, 193 (2008). The California appellate court held, however, that the
local government's dumping of sweet sweepings adjacent to their property was neither a
compensable taking nor a nuisance. Id. at 234.
249. See Gillette, supra note 86, at 1429 (identifying the "busybody" phenomenon).
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The decision to plant a flower garden or a water-stingy landscape of
cactus, instead of the plain grass lawn mandated by so many HOAs 2 50
even in dry regions of the nation, is nonetheless an expression of
individual personality and dignity. A nontraditional lawn is often an
important step in water and environmental conservation, as the Florida
and other state legislatures have recognized. 2 5 1 At the same time, such
nontraditional landscaping would be unlikely to rise to the level of a
nuisance, even if the nontraditional yard decreased property values of
neighbors a smidgen. Accordingly, the ability of homeowners to adopt
nontraditional but neat landscaping might be a good candidate for
inclusion in a bill of rights.
Similarly, aesthetics of a home's exterior, such as paint color, are a
frequent target of HOA covenants, which often require uniform or
muted colors. Once again, the concern appears to be that a garish or
otherwise unusual paint job will annoy a neighbor or decrease property
values. Unlike water-tolerant landscaping, a disfavored paint job-such
as a house painted a garish bright pink-is unlikely to reflect any
socially responsible policy.25 2 Moreover, to the extent that rules about
appearance of the home target neatness, as opposed to taste, they
infringe little on personal liberty. Accordingly, rules on exterior paint
colors would appear to form a relatively weaker case for a claim of
personal liberty.
Similarly, advocates of allowing clotheslines in backyardssomething that was common before the rise of the mechanical dryer but
that often is banned by HOAs-have begun a movement that they
amusingly call the "right to dry." 253 Advocates of a "right to dry" point
out that they use less energy and generate less pollution than using a
machine. 2 5 4 Like requirements for a traditionally well-kept lawn, rules
against clotheslines appear to arise from a desire to create a well-heeled
and uncluttered appearance in an HOA community. Clotheslines are
associated with poorer communities that cannot afford mechanical

250. See discussion of the Association of Artificial & Synthetic Grass Installers, Bill Would
Let Agencies Trump Homeowners Association Rules (2009), http://www.asgi.us/2009/03/ hoamwd-ab1061.
251. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.3075(4) (2008) (HOA residents have the rights to
"Florida-friendly" landscaping, regardless of HOA covenants); Connie Lewis, DroughtPrompts
Rising Tide ofInterest in Water Savings, 30 SAN DIEGo Bus. J. 23, June 8, 2009, at 1 (discussing
efforts in California to override HOA covenants).
252. This is not to say that there is always a bright line distinguishing the categories. An
unusual homeowner might, for example, desire to paint a political message on the exterior wall
of his or her house.
253. See Right to Dry, http://right2dry.org (last visited July 22, 2009).
254. See id.
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dryers and that are not bothered by allowing others to see their laundry.
But a typical clothesline would never be considered so bothersome as to
be a nuisance. Accordingly, like landscaping, clotheslines do not rise to
the same depth or importance of expression as do signs or other political
communications.
Finally, many HOAs bar or tightly regulate accessory structures,
such as sheds, gazebos, grills, and basketball nets. While these
accessories undoubtedly reflect the individual desires of the resident,
rules against them appear to be closely aligned with cross-boundary
harms that have been traditionally regulated as nuisances, such as
noises, odors, and views. 25 5 Moreover, rules prohibiting the expansions
of a residence, such as by building a wing or adding a floor, are often
covered by strict governmental zoning and land use laws. 2 56
Accordingly, HOA rules regulating accessories or the bulk of the
residence are, as a category, a weak candidate for inclusion within a set
of rights.
In accordance with these relative judgments, we may draft a
statutory right to free expression for HOA residents. One cannot
"prove" that this draft is the only appropriate mirror of the right of
personal expression in the context of an HOA; there may be valid
arguments for either narrowing or expanding this draft. Nonetheless,
erring on the side of inclusiveness, here is a model for a state statutory
right to free expression for HOA residents:
Right to Free Speech and Expression in HOA Communities:
A resident in an HOA community holds the following rights
to free speech and free expression; no HOA covenant, conditions,
or rules may interfere with these rights:
(1) Each resident holds the right to display three nonilluminated signs, not larger than three feet by three feet in size,
255. Traditional nuisance law allows a claim for excessive noise. C.J.S. Nuisances § 29
(2009), and sometimes for blocking visions; Engle v. Ogburn, 1999 WL 1231806, at 6 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1999) (noting that foliage and vegetation that blocks the view of automobile drivers may
constitute a nuisance). Zoning laws typically include height and bulk restrictions on buildings.
See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388, 395-96 (1926) (landmark decision
upholding the constitutionality of an early zoning ordinance that imposed limitations on
building's use and heights and the ratio of building size to lot size).
256. Similarly, there is little ground for a right to park one's vehicle on the common
street-conduct that often is prohibited by HOA rule. See, e.g., Understanding Homeowners
Associations, What to do About Parking, http://hoacommunitysolutions.wordpress.com/2009/
04/03/what-to-do-about-parking/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
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in the front of a resident's property, as long as the signs are
placed either on the house or apartment structure, or, if on a yard,
placed within the central third of the resident's property, as
measured from any other residential property on either side, and
within the two-thirds of the yard closest to the house, as
measured from a street or public way.
(2) In the two months preceding a primary or general
governmental election in the locality, the resident holds the right
to place an unlimited number of signs of the size and location
specified in paragraph (a).
(3) A resident holds the right to express political views or any
other free speech idea through oral communication on the
resident's property and to distribute information and literature on
the resident's property, unless the time, place, or manner of
conduct constitutes a nuisance under applicable state law (such as
through amplified communication during the sleeping hours).
(4) A resident holds the right to develop a landscaped
property in any way that is recognized by landscape design
professionals, such as a water-tolerant landscape, a bird-friendly
landscape, or a suburban wildlife-friendly landscape, as long as
the conduct does not constitute a nuisance under applicable state
law. This right does not extend to an HOA covenant that
regulates foliage in order to protect a specific view or views from
another residence or common area.
(5) A resident holds the rights to choose the paint color or
color combination of the exterior. This right does not prevent an
HOA from creating and enforcing rules that concern the neatness
of the exterior painting, the frequency of painting, or fixtures on
the exterior of the residence.
(6) There is no right of a resident to use the rights enumerated
in this section to create excessive noises or smells, or engage in
other conduct that may be regulated as a nuisance under
applicable state law.
B. Right to BearArms
Depending on one's view of public policy, the U.S. Constitution's
Second Amendment "right to bear arms 57 might or might not seem an
appropriate fit within an HOA resident's bill of rights. Interestingly,
257. U.S. CONST. amend. II. In full, the Second Amendment states: "A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed."
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most HOAs reportedly hold restrictions against firearms in homes-a
point which, if we follow the voluntary contract model of HOA rulesreflects a widespread desire of HOA residents to live in a community
without guns.
There is no doubt, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court has given
an individual's right to firearms a status similar to the rights in the First
Amendment. In the 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,25 9
the Court rejected arguments that the "right to bear arms" refers to
things other than a citizen's right to possess weapons, and rejected
arguments that the amendment's prefatory phrase concerning a "well
regulated Militia" and "security of free state" limits this right to the
collective right of state militias.2 60 Although governments may regulate
firearm possession, they cannot simply ban it.2 6 1 The Court's opinion,
written by Justice Scalia, relied in large part on the traditional right of
Englishmen to possess guns in their homes-the traditional right that
formed the background for passage of the Second Amendment. 62 The
local law at issue was unconstitutional, the Court held, because it
banned handgun possession in the home, "where the need for defense of
self, family, and property is most acute." 2 6 3
Accordingly, if we follow federal constitutional law, the right to
possess a firearm in one's home dovetails with the other rights of
human integrity in the home, regardless of whether this conclusion
might annoy advocates of non-gun-related personal liberties.264 If stored
and handled properly, firearms such as rifles and handguns within a
home pose little threat to neighbors; moreover, mere possession is
unlikely to be actionable as a nuisance. Accordingly, the right to
firearms in the home is another relatively strong candidate for inclusion
in an HOA resident bill of rights, perhaps along these lines:
Right to Firearms in the Home.
A resident in an HOA community holds the right to possess

258. See, e.g., SETHA Low, BEHIND THE GATES 162 (discussing the common covenants
against handguns in HOA communities).
259. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
260. Id. at 2797-803.
261. Id. at 2818-19.
262. Id. at 2815-16.
263. Id. at 2817.
264. The American Civil Liberties Union, for example, takes the position that Heller was
unwise and that the regulation of guns does not "raise[]a civil liberties issue." ACLU, Second
Amendment, http://www.aclu.org/crimjustice/gen/35904res20020304.html (last visited Sept. 24,
2009).
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firearms in the home; no HOA covenant, condition, or rule may
interfere with this right. An HOA may, however, regulate the
terms of possession of such firearms by rules involving storage,
locks, and security. The HOA may regulate or ban certain
firearms, such as assault rifles or automatic weapons, that are not
typically used for home security, and the HOA may regulate or
ban the possession of such firearms in common areas of the
community.
C. Rights Specific to Government
The Third Amendment of the U.S. Constitution creates a right
against the quartering of troops-something that even the toughest
HOA presumably has not done (yet!). 2 6 5 This highlights the fact that, of
the twenty-seven amendments of the U.S. Constitution, many are not
directly relevant to our crafting of an HOA resident bill of rights. First,
a number of provisions relate specifically to the rights of the criminally
accused, including Amendments Five (concerning the rights to a grand
jury, against double jeopardy, and against self-incrimination), Six
(rights in a criminal trial, including the right to confront witnesses),
Seven (right to a jury trial), and Eight (right against excessive bail).2
Although some of these rights may bear faint echoes of HOA
enforcement proceedings, there is, needless to say, an imperfect match
with the criminal justice system. Moreover, most states have statutes
that grant procedural rights to an HOA resident in cases of adjudication
and punishment by an HOA board, which are separate from the
substantive rights that are the subject of this current inquiry.2 67
Accordingly, these procedural strictures, as well as the amorphous
procedural "due process" right in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment,
are ill-suited to an HOA bill of rights. 2 68 Other amendments relate to the
workings of the federal government, including the military, or federalstate relations (Amendments Three, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, Seventeen,
Twenty, Twenty-Two, Twenty-Three, Twenty-Five, and TwentySeven). These are not directly relevant to substantive rights of HOA
residents. The Thirteenth Amendment's ban on against slavery applies
in all situations, not just governmental conduct. 2 69

265. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
266. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, VII, & VIII.
267. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1350-1359 (codifying the DavisStirling Common Interest Development Act); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-33.3-101.
268. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
269. The Thirteenth Amendment states: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
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A number of amendments relate to the right to vote (Fifteen,
Nineteen, Twenty-Four, and Twenty-Six) or to tax (Amendment
Sixteen)-topics that typically are already covered by state HOA
procedural laws.2 7 0 This is not to say that voting rights at an HOA have
not been the subject of great controversy. As shown in Twin Rivers, for
example, it is common for HOAs to grant greater voting ower to
residents with a larger property or greater assessed value.2 Such a
weighted voting system would violate the constitutional one-person,
one-vote principle that applies to governmental elections272 and echoes
the now-discredited property qualifications for voting that used to be
common in eighteenth and early nineteenth century American state
politics. 2 73 The rationale for weighted voting is that homeowners with
larger houses have a greater financial stake in the success of the
community, of which the maintenance of property values usually is the
primary long-term concern of HOA governance. 274 In Twin Rivers,
however, even the activist appellate court found that weighted voting
did not violate state constitutional principles of personal integrity.
Similarly, here, because voting rights often are regulated to some extent
by state procedural law, and because the weight of voting is not a
substantive right per se, it is excluded from the current shaping of an
HOA resident bill of rights. 27 5

as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
270. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 1356; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.3075; COLO. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 38-33.3-217.
271. See Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 890 A.2d
947, 975 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2006) (upholding against a challenge of the HOA's weighted
voting system).
272. See Baker v Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 344 (1962) (establishing the principle of one person,
one vote); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 739 (1983) (imposing the one person, one vote
principle on state governments).
273.

See CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

73-74 (1944) (discussing 18th century property qualifications to vote).
274. See McKENZIE, supra note 22, at 122 (noting that maintenance of property values is
the fundamental purpose of the HOA).
275. This Article does not discuss the potential implications of the Ninth Amendment,
which somewhat obscurely "retained" certain rights "by the people" that were not specifically
enumerated. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Because of the open-ended nature of this language, it has
played little role in the development of the law of constitutional rights. See generally Thomas
McAffee, Federalism and the Protection of Rights: The Modern Ninth Amendment's Spreading
Confusion, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REv. 351 (1996) (arguing for a broad interpretation of the right). This
Article does not suggest a similar right in an HOA resident bill of rights.
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D. The Right Against Uncompensated "Taking"
The only substantive right in the U.S. Constitution that specifically
refers to property is the Fifth Amendment's command that government
may not "take" private property "without just compensation." 276 Indeed,
this right has generated a complex legal doctrine of the relationship
between a property owner and government regulators; as such, it might
at first appear to be a good centerpiece for an HOA resident bill of
rights. Ellickson has suggested that residents might be given this
"taking" right against HOA board regulations. 27 7
But there are many complications in transferring this provision of the
Fifth Amendment to HOAs. First, unlike other constitutional rights, the
prohibition against unjust taking is not truly a substantive right of a
citizen against government interference; rather, the right merely
establishes that if government "takes" property, it must compensate the
property owner with money. 2 78 Most historians agree that the framers
intended to require only that government compensate property owners
when it exercises the power of eminent domain to seize private
property.279 In the past century, the right has been construed to compel
compensation, in some circumstances, for a mere regulation of land

276. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Property is also mentioned in the due process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which command that government may not "deprive" a
person of "property" without "due process of law." By the term "process," these clauses would
seem to refer to procedure, not substance. Nonetheless, this did not stop the Supreme Court from
creating in effect a doctrine of "substantive due process." In the now-infamous decision of Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857), the Supreme Court held that a federal statute
seeking to deprive a citizen of his "property" "could hardly be dignified with the name of due
process of law." Id. Because the notion of "substantive due process" provides a hook to create
whatever enumerated right the judge desires to create, the principle has been applied
inconsistently, first to justify a right to economic freedom, most notably in Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (holding that a state law regulating working hours for bakers was
unconstitutional), and more recently in the creation of a right to privacy, in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (right to privacy created through a "penumbra" of other
rights) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (right to privacy includes a limited right to
abortion). Because of the amorphousness of the "substantive due process" doctrine and its
potential for abuse, I do not suggest that such a principle be codified in an HOA resident bill of
rights.
277. See Ellickson, supranote 8, at 1530.
278. U.S. CONST. amend. V (government may not "take" property for public use "without
just compensation").
279. See generally William M. Treanor, The OriginalUnderstandingof the Takings Clause
and the PoliticalProcess, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782 (1995) (concluding that the drafters of the
Fifth Amendment intended the takings clause to apply only to governmental seizures of
property); Note, The PrincipleofEquality in Takings ClauseJurisprudence, 109 HARV. L. REv.
1030 (1996) (outlining the expansion of takings jurisprudence).
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without seizure of title. 2 80 The doctrine that has developed is
extraordinarily amorphous. Suffice to say, however, that minor
regulations of property use do not rise to the level of a compensable
taking.28 1
Indeed, in nearly all cases in which a property owner has developed
a strong case for a compensable regulatory taking, the government has
severely restricted a pre-existing right to build on the land, thus
significantly upsetting an "investment-backed expectation." 28 2 In the
landmark Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the
U.S. Supreme Court rejected an argument that regulations that hindered
construction of a large office building on top of a governmentally
designated historic landmark constituted a regulatory taking; the law
does not conceptually "sever" portions of a property in deciding
whether a taking has occurred. 3 The most notable victory for a
property owner was Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council, in which
a governmental body in effect barred a landowner from building
anything on his coastal land, causing him to lose all of his million-dollar
investment.284 Such a "total taking" is the most common way in which a
regulatory taking claim is successfully asserted.
In contrast to the successful federal takings cases, HOAs do not
typically bar residents from engaging in major construction projects in
which they have already invested money. There are unlikely to be
many, if any, "total taking" cases involving HOAs, and only rare cases
in which an HOA covenant is as dramatically restrictive as the Penn
Central or Lucas cases. Most HOA rules of construction-for example,
a rule that prohibits work sheds over six feet wide in the backyard-are
minor regulations for which no compensation is required under federal
28
law.285 In fact, many zoning and land use laws have small adverse

280. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding for the first time that
government regulation may trigger compensation if it "goes too far"). Holmes's vague standard
has bedeviled the law ever since.
281. Id. at 413 ("Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.").
282. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (referring to a
property owner's claim of "investment-backed expectations" as a relevant consideration in the
decision whether to consider a regulation a compensable taking).
283. Id. at 130 ("'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated. Rather, it looks at the effects on the property as a whole.").
284. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992) (compensation
required for a regulation that created a "total taking").
285. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) (regulation is not a
compensable taking if it regulates only a small portion of the property and allows for
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effects on property values for which no compensation is required under
federal law. 2 6 Rather, we might look to state law to develop a
conceivably workable "takings" right for HOAs. Over the past twenty
years, a handful of states have gone beyond federal constitutional law
and have required government to compensate landowners when
government regulates the land so that the value of the land has been
diminished by a certain percentage or amount.2 87 Although it would be a
rare case in which an HOA rule causes a major diminution in property
value-an example might be a rule that prohibited for the first time the
construction of a second story on a house, just as new property owner
signed a contract with a builder, in reliance on a pre-existing right-we
can craft a potential takings right for HOA residents as follows:
Right against an Uncompensated Taking.
An HOA may not upset the reasonable investment-backed
expectations of a resident by a covenant, condition, or rule that
diminishes the value of the resident's property by more than 50
percent, unless the HOA compensates the resident for the value
of the diminution. This right applies only to diminutions causes
exclusively by HOA rules, and not by the changes in housing
values not within the sole control of the HOA. The right does not
apply to diminutions that regulate conduct that is considered a
nuisance under applicable state law. A resident may establish a
right to compensation only by presenting evidence of the
diminished property value through a report of a state-licensed
property appraiser; if the HOA denies compensation by virtue of
reliance on another assessment by another state-licensed property
appraiser, the resident holds the right to resolve the dispute by
appeal to state court.

economically beneficial use of the remainder).
286. The Court in Lucas stated that it was "unclear" whether a regulatory taking that is less
than total would require compensation. 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. But there is ample precedent for
cases in which even a large diminution in property value did not trigger compensation. See, e.g.,
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (law prohibiting manufacture of alcoholic beverages,
thus decreasing the value of a brewery property); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)
(law barring operation of brick kiln in residential area, thus decreasing the value of the kiln
property).
287. See STATE ENVTL. REs. CTR., Takings Legislation, http://www.serconline.org/
Takings/stateactivity.html (summarizing some significant state laws). Many states trigger
compensation when a regulation or law diminishes property value by a certain percentage.

532

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA W & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 20

E. The Right Against Housing Discrimination

The anti-discrimination principle set forth by the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been imposed on private
housing relations by various statutes at both the national and state level.
Most notably is the federal Fair Housing Act, 28 8 which makes it
unlawful to discriminate because of race, national origin, reli ion, and
other grounds in the advertisement, sale, or rental of housing. 9 All of
these proscriptions apply with full force to HOAs. Many states go
further and include sexual orientation and other factors as unlawful
grounds for discrimination. 2 90 Even before the Fair Housing Act, the
U.S. Supreme Court held as early as 1949 that federal courts could not
enforce racially discriminatory covenants.291 Because of the
to
governmental occupancy of this field, it might seem 2 9unnecessary
include similar rights in an HOA resident bill of rights. 2 Nonetheless,
such an HOA right could be written as follows:
Right Against Discrimination.
An HOA may not, in its covenants, conditions, and rules, or in
the application thereof, discriminate on the basis of race, sex,
national origin, religion, or sexual orientation, if such
discrimination is a significant factor in the HOA's conduct. This
prohibition includes, but is not limited to, advertisement,
marketing, sale, rental, participation in HOA affairs, governance,
and enforcement of rules.

288. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).
289. Id. § 3604 (making it unlawful to discriminate in various aspects of the housing
relationship).
290. Liberal-oriented localities across the nation have enacted ordinances outlawing
housing discrimination based on sexual orientation. See, e.g., City of Gainesville, Fla. Ord. §
8.86, available at http://municode.com/resources/gateway.asp?pid=,10819&sid=9; City of
South Portland, Me. Ord. § 10-1101, available at http://www.memun.org/SchoolsProject/
Resources/Ordinance/SexOrientationSP.htm; City of Austin, Tex., Fair Housing Ordinance,
http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/hrights/housing.htm.
291. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of a
racially restrictive covenant would violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
292. After all, in a state that declined to protect against sexual orientation discrimination in
housing in general, it seems unlikely that this state would entertain a statutory right against such
discrimination in the somewhat voluntary world of HOA communities.
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F. Rights Inside the Home

The remaining amendments in the U.S. Constitution that might relate
to HOAs 2 93 are the Fourth Amendment's right against "unreasonable"
searches and seizures 2 9 4 and the Twenty-First Amendment's repeal of
alcohol prohibition. 2 95 While these two provisions might seem
unrelated, they both point to a final category in the shaping of an HOA
resident bill of rights: the rights of liberty inside the residence.
The regulation of conduct behind closed doors is an area in which
HOAs have often extended their covenants and rules beyond the
regulations of government. Federal, state, and local laws typically do
not regulate conduct wholly inside homes, with the exceptions of laws
to protect other persons-such as laws against violent crime or against
usage of mood-altering narcotics. Beyond this, citizens are largely free
to do what they desire inside their homes. By contrast, some HOAs, in
pursuit of what Franzese calls a community of the "nice," regulate
things such as interior paint and furniture design,296 smoking and
drinking,2 9 7 and the possession of pets.2 98
Many of these interior activities may not seem as important to
personal integrity as political expression. However, most of these
interior activities also have little or nothing to do with the neighbors'
enjoyment or use of their own property, or with significantly affecting
293. This Article also does not discuss potential implications of the Ninth Amendment. See
supra note 275.
294. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states that warrants to search or seize
may be granted only upon a showing of "probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched . .. or things to be seized." Id.
295. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. The Twenty-First Amendment repealed the Eighteenth
Amendment, which imposed restrictions on obtaining liquor. The Twenty-First Amendment
does not grant a right; it merely permits states to enact their own regulations concerning the
manufacture, possession, and consumption of alcohol. Many states and localities do regulate or
even ban the sale of alcohol. See David J. Hanson, Dry Counties, http://www2.potsdam.
edu/hansondj/controversies/1 140551076.html (discussing alcohol prohibition across the United
States). Accordingly, the amendment does not grant an individual right.
296. See, e.g., Cypress Creek Homeowners Association Architectural Control Committee
Rules, http://www.cypresscreekhoa.org/documents/ACC%20Rules.pdf (requests for interior
painting done on a case-by-case basis).
297 For examples of covenants banning smoking in townhouses, see HOA Rule Forbids
Couple to Smoke in Their Own Home, Denver 7 News (Nov. 18, 2006), http://www.thedenver
channel.com/news/10336501/detail.html; Julian Emerson, Housing Complex Owners Vote to
Ban Smoking, LEADER-TELEGRAM (Eau Claire, Wis.), July 19, 2009, http://www.tobaccofacts.net/2009/07/housing-complex-owners-vote-to-ban-smoking.
298. See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275 (1994) (upholding
no-pet covenant).

534

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VoL 20

the neighbors' property values. Rules against interior conduct might be
considered a prime example of "busybody" regulation-that is,
regulation for its own sake. The chief exception would be regulation of
nuisance-like activities-odors, noises, and smoke-that extend from
the interior onto others' property.
Similarly, there appears to be little justification for an HOA rule that
authorizes the search or seizure of the interior of a residence, except in
connection with issues of community integrity, such as emergency
repairs in a condominium building or to enter an HOA house on fire
when the owner is not home. These exceptions would not authorize
covenants that allowed HOA board members, for example, to enter
homes simply to gather evidence to support a suspicion of a violation of
other rules. Accordingly, our final provision in the draft HOA resident
bill of rights could read as follows:
Right to Conduct and Privacy Inside the Home
(1) An HOA resident holds the right to unregulated conduct
inside the home, including the right to choose interior paint, place
furniture, decorate, smoke, drink alcohol, engage in sexual
activity, entertain others, or own pets that that are confined to the
interior of the home. This right does not extend to conduct that
causes significant odors, smoke, or sounds that might
significantly interfere with other residents' use or enjoyment of
property. Specifically, an HOA may regulate or ban a resident's
allowing a dog to occupy the exterior yard. This right also does
not extend to conduct that is unlawful or a nuisance under
federal, state, or local law.
(2) An HOA resident holds the right to refuse entry by others,
including other residents and HOA board members, without the
resident's permission. This right does not extend to entries
deemed necessary, consistent with HOA rules, for the physical or
structural protection of common areas or buildings, or the
physical safety of residents, after discussion with the resident
when feasible. If an HOA rule purports to grant the authority to
enter a residence for other purposes, this authority may be
exercised only by application to an appropriate state court.
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

With the burst of the most recent housing "bubble" and its resultant
economic recession, many commentators predicted "the death of the
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suburbs" and planned communities. 2 99 I believe that such assertions are
exaggerated. The desire for a home and yard has always been deeply
embedded in the American psyche; neither the tightening of mortgage
credit nor high gasoline prices will likely alter this predisposition.
The extraordinary rise of the common-interest residential community,
which I have abbreviated as HOA in this Article, is due in part to
government encouragement, but in larger part due to the aspirations of
American families for communities in which the peace and happiness of
their surroundings is close to guaranteed, even if this requires
constraining one's neighbors.3 0 1 The lull in new HOA construction may
prove to be ephemeral. If American families did decide to move en
masse back into the central cities, this would generate a boom in
condominium associations, the city's variant of HOAs.
This desire for a regulated community does not mean, however, that
any and all HOA covenants are the welcome reflection of market
demand. Economic and psychological phenomena, such as the problems
of "bundling," geographic restraints, skewed HOA board incentives,
and the lack of discretionary enforcement, each point to a conclusion
that law should scrutinize more closely the breadth of substantive HOA
rules. The challenge for the legal reformer is separating unjustified
covenants from those that law should respect as voluntary choice.
Considering the range of criticisms of HOA covenants, it is not
surprising that there is no single or noncontroversial analytical tool for
scrutinizing such rules. Accordingly, the bill of rights proposed in this
Article is not set in stone, but rather suggests a starting point for
discussion.

299. See, e.g., Richard Florida, How the Crash Will Reshape America, ATLANTIC (Mar.
2009), available at http://wwwtheatlantic.com/doc/200903/meltdown-geography (predicting
that many Americans will return to the city and eschew the suburbs); Christopher B. Leinberger,
The Next Slum?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2008) http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200803/subprime
(predicting the demise of suburban subdivisions). For an interesting study of the possible future
of homeownership, see Fennell, supranote 56.
300. See, e.g., Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs ofSprawl, 29 URB.
LAW. 183, 186 (1998) ("Suburbanization and sprawl are as ingrained in our national myth as
baseball and apple pie once were.").
301. See Robert W. Burchell & Naveed A. Shad, The Evolution of the Sprawl Debate in the
United States, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 137, 149 (1997) (citing surveys of
preferences for suburban living); Paul Boudreaux, Looking the Ogre in the Eye: Ten Tough
Questions for the Antisprawl Movement, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 171, 184 (2000) (discussing
reasons for suburbanization); BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Job Sprawl Revisited: The Changing
Geography of Metropolitan Employment (2009), http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2009/0406_
job sprawl.kneebone.aspx (noting that employment has continued to move to suburbs in recent
years).
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I have proposed focusing on the principle of personal liberty and
integrity at the home, curbed by the traditional tort law of nuisance, in
shaping a bill of rights for HOA residents. By their nature, rights are
counter-majoritarian-they allow people to do what the majority of
peers prefer that they not do. While such a notion may be novel in the
world of HOA covenants, it is a mainstay in the law of scrutinizing
governmental laws, through which American citizens hold cherished
rights to a range of freedoms, especially concerning expression,
especially at their homes. To be sure, the "private governments" of
HOAs are not identical to public governments, and law should not
impose all of the rules governing relations between citizens and their
public governments on private covenant-bound communities. But to the
extent that HOAs have become a standard form of residential life in the
United States-and throughout much of the Sunbelt this may already be
the case-the residents of these communities, who often have no other
real choice, deserve their own set of rights to engage in free expression
and other manifestations of personal liberty at their homes.

